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ESSAY
TWO VIEWS OF THE RIVER: A CRITIQUE OF THE
LIBERAL DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Charles R. Lawrence III*
In response to the attack on affirmative action at educational institu-
tions, the argument that the benefits of diversity necessitate keeping affirma-
tive action has emerged as the dominant defense of race-conscious admissions
policies. Describing this argument as the "liberal defense of affirmative ac-
tion, "Professor Lawrence critiques the liberal defense because it fails to chal-
lenge the manner in which traditional standards of merit perpetuate race
and class privilege, and pushes aside more radical, substantive defenses of
affirmative action which articulate the need to remedy past and ongoing
discrimination. While recognizing the difficulties and ambivalence inherent
in advancing a new vision for defending affirmative action, Professor Law-
rence points to post-Proposition 209 litigation by students of color against the
Regents of the University of California to articulate a theory of transforma-
tive politics upon which to base future strategies for maintaining affirmative
action and dismantling racial injustice.
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Cartoonist Gary Trudeau's genius is the truth his characters speak.
The earnest young man from the law school's development office exudes
liberal angst, but rather than the expected excuses and euphemisms, he
simply says, "We no longer admit black people."'
Trudeau's cartoon is a commentary on a tragic moment in the his-
tory of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law, known as
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Haverford College,
1965; J.D., Yale Law School, 1969. My thanks go to Angela Harris, Patricia King, Mari
Matsuda, Elizabeth Patterson, and Girardeau Spann for their helpful comments on
previous versions of this essay, and to Anna Diamanti, Suzanne Kim, and Marsha Scipio for
their excellent research assistance.
1. Garry Trudeau, Doonesbury, Oct. 21, 1997, available at http://www.doonesbury.
ucomics.com/strip/dailydose/indexl9971021.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
Doonesbury © 1997 G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of Universal Press
Syndicate. All rights reserved.
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Boalt Hall. In the fall of 1997, only one African American matriculated in
Boalt Hall's first-year class. That year, the law school had admitted only
eighteen African-American applicants-fifty-nine fewer than had been
admitted the year before. 2 All of them decided to attend law school else-
where, leaving as the lone black person in the entering class a young man
who had deferred his admission from the previous year.3
For two and a half decades Boalt Hall had been on the front lines of
the struggle for equality. 4 Its student body was among the nation's most
diverse. 5 But more than that, Boalt Hall was a place where students were
engaged. They challenged each other to learn about their different
worlds and cultures. They challenged their professors to live up to the
ideals they taught. They walked-out, sat-in, drafted resolutions, and held
hearings and teach-ins about racism and sexism, homophobia and pov-
erty. They organized conferences and established journals. They learned
the skills of advocacy and problem solving-as often in the hallways as in
the classroom-as much from their peers as from their professors. Bril-
liant, creative, idealistic students applied to Boalt Hall, and chose to study
there, because they wanted to learn with and from their fellow students.
The law school's prestige in academic and professional circles grew as it
became more diverse. Affirmative action hardly diminished its stature.
Rather, Boalt Hall was a great law school because of affirmative action.
Now all of that is in jeopardy. The larger tragedy is that Boalt Hall is
not alone. Political and judicial attacks on affirmative action have also
2. See Jocelyn Y. Stewart, Black Colleges Woo Students Alienated by Prop. 209, L.A.
Times, Nov. 25, 1997, at 1; University of California's Law Schools, at http://www.ucop.
edu/acadadv/datamgmt/lawdata/lawschl2.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
3. Ellen Nakashima & Mike Allen, Educators Concerned About Affirmative Action,
Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1997, at B3.
4. Boalt Hall's leadership role as a significantly integrated law school did not begin
until the late 1960s. From 1960 to 1964, blacks and Latinos combined made up less than
one half of one percent of Boalt's entering class, and in 1964, ten years after Brown v. Board
of Education, Boalt Hall had no African-American students. Significant increases in
minority enrollment did not occur until the urban uprisings of 1967 and 1968 prompted
the University of California to introduce affirmative action programs that used race as an
explicit "plus" factor in the admission of qualified minority applicants. Constance L. Rice,
Affirmative Action in the Post-Proposition 209 Era 4-5 (Jan. 14, 1999) (paper presented at
the American Council on Education's Consortium on Achieving Inclusion and Equity in
Higher Education) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
5. For example, within the past decade, Boalt Hall has consistently surpassed national
averages for minority representation in law schools. During the 1990-1991 academic year,
13.6% of law students nationally were minorities. American Bar Association Commission
on Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession, Miles to Go: Progress of Minorities in
the Legal Profession 1 (1998) [hereinafter Miles to Go]. That year, 35.3% of Boalt Hall's
students were minorities. University of California, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law (Boalt Hall) 2000 Annual Admissions Report 9 (2000) [hereinafter Boalt
Admissions Report]. This trend continued until the 1996-1997 academic year, when
19.7% of the nation's law students were minorities, Miles to Go, supra, at 1, compared to
37.3% of Boalt's students. Boalt Admissions Report, supra, at 9. University of California's
Law Schools, supra note 2.
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devastated the law schools at UCLA 6 and the University of Texas. 7 The
University of Michigan is fighting for its life as an integrated institution. 8
The tragedy of the re-segregation of these great public law schools
resonates far beyond their campuses. Consider that between 1987 and
1997, Berkeley and UCLA together trained nearly 600 black lawyers and
more than 800 Latino lawyers." These numbers do not begin to tell the
story of how those individuals have changed the complexion and culture
of their state and national bars.
I write this essay as an unambivalent advocate for affirmative ac-
tion.' 0 Affirmative action has changed my life. It has opened doors for
me and given me the chance to do the work I love. I have watched stu-
dents and colleagues walk through those same opened doors and change
the institutions and communities where I work and live. I am, however,
6. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that Proposition 209, a state constitutional amendment which prohibits state and
local governments from adopting affirmative action programs in public employment,
contracting, or education, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause). For the 1996 school year, prior to the elimination of race-sensitive affirmative
action at the UC graduate level, nineteen black students and forty-five Latino students were
enrolled at the UCLA School of Law. In 1997, that number dropped to ten black students
and thirty-nine Latino students. In 1998, the enrollment figures dropped even further, to
eight black students and sixteen Latino students. In 1999, three black students and
eighteen Latino students enrolled. University of California's Law Schools, supra note 2.
7. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying strict
scrutiny to invalidate a state university law school's broad affirmative action program
absent a showing that the program was tailored to remedy the present effects of specific
instances of past discrimination). After affirmative action was eliminated at the University
of Texas Law School, the number of black students accepted dropped from sixty-five in
1996 to eleven in 1997, and only four of the eleven enrolled in a first-year class of more
than 400. The number of Latino first-year students declined by 46% and the number of
Native-American first-year students by 40%. In the wake of Hopwood the University of
Texas Law School has seen applications decline from highly-qualified white and Asian-
American students as well as black and Latino students. Appellants' Final Brief at 8,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2009).
8. In a lawsuit challenging the race-conscious admissions policy at the University of
Michigan's law school, the district court stated that "the attainment of a racially diverse
student body is not a compelling state interest" and violated the Constitution. Grutter v.
Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2001), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3256, at
*81, *93. For a similar case involving the University of Maryland, see Podberesky v. Kirwan,
38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating state university scholarship program that
attempted to remedy past discrimination by excluding all races from consideration except
African-Americans).
9. According to combined data from the office of the registrar at each institution,
Berkeley and UCLA awardedJDs to 597 black students and 801 Latino students from 1987
to 1997. This figure on Latino graduates includes Mexican-American students. Similarly,
the University of Texas Law School, pre-Hopwood, had produced more than 650 African-
American and 1,300 Mexican-American lawyers. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Race and
Affirmative Action: A Critical Race Perspective, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique 313, 312 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Lawrence, Race and
Affirmative Action].
10. See Charles R. Lawrence III & MariJ. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the
Case for Affirmative Action 1-2 (1997).
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less certain about where I stand on the subject of this essay: the liberal
defense of affirmative action. Affirmative action is under siege, and I am
grateful for liberal colleagues who stand beside me to defend it. Often I
feel as if I am part of an army in retreat. I am distressed by that retreat,
but I am also troubled by the argument that most colleges and universi-
ties now use to defend affirmative action, an argument that I refer to in
this essay as the "liberal defense of affirmative action."
The liberal defense of affirmative action is often called the "diversity
defense." Both the appellation and the argument have their origins in
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke.II When Justice Powell found that the University of Califor-
nia medical school affirmative action program violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, he suggested that universities might successfully defend race-
sensitive admissions policies if they were necessary to achieve racially di-
verse student bodies.' 2
My chief purpose here is not to analyze Justice Powell's diversity ar-
gument.1 3 Rather, I am concerned that liberal supporters of affirmative
action have used the diversity argument to defend affirmative action at
elite universities and law schools without questioning the ways that tradi-
tional admissions criteria continue to perpetuate race and class privilege.
I argue that as diversity has emerged as the dominant defense of affirma-
tive action in the university setting, it has pushed other, more radical sub-
stantive defenses to the background. These more radical arguments fo-
cus on the need to remedy past discrimination, address present
discriminatory practices, and reexamine traditional notions of merit and
the role of universities in the reproduction of elites. I ask why liberal
academics are so attracted to the diversity defense and suggest that the
legal formalism of antidiscrimination law and the logical implications of
liberal political theory influence their choice. Ultimately, I raise ques-
tions about my own attraction to and participation in the liberal defense
and ask how a critical race theorist should engage his liberal allies in the
midst of the day-to-day battle to keep affirmative action alive. This essay
serves as an exploration of my own ambivalence about the diversity de-
fense, even as I critique the rationale.
Part I sets out the "liberal defense." I use the current litigation at-
tacking the University of Michigan's admission policies and an influential
book by two former Ivy League presidents as examples of this defense.
Proponents of affirmative action have made a compelling case for consid-
ering race in university admissions through the compilation of data and
evidence that counter the standard anti-affirmative action arguments
11. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
12. See id. at 312-13.
13. Elsewhere I have criticized Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. See Charles R.
Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 757,
766-75 (1997) [hereinafter Lawrence, Harvest].
2001]
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about the admission and supposed stigmatization of "unqualified" stu-
dents of color and demonstrate the educational benefits of racial integra-
tion. Nonetheless, the purpose and effect of the diversity defense is to
preserve the status quo by integrating existing elites and is, therefore,
essentially conservative. Part II introduces a suit filed by black, Latino,
and Filipino-American students against the University of California at
Berkeley. The Berkeley example contrasts the liberal defense of affirma-
tive action with one that places the project of racial justice at the center of
the rationale for affirmative action and demonstrates how the liberal de-
fense fails to challenge university faculties to examine their own race and
class privilege.
Part III examines my own ambivalence toward the liberal defense of
affirmative action. My ambivalence is both practical and ideological. If
the liberal defense will garner the most support in the Supreme Court
and among potential political allies because of its conservatism, how
should I position myself in the debate? If I oppose the liberal defense,
will I sacrifice the good that affirmative action has done in the name of
principle? Will I aid and abet the attack on affirmative action from the
right? If racial integration is a good, should I not join wholeheartedly in
its defense? In Part LV, I suggest that affirmative action supporters can
resolve this dilemma by engaging in politics that challenge the liberal
defenders of affirmative action to understand and embrace their own
moral commitment to ending racism. The particulars of this politics will
change with context, but it must always keep before us the tension be-
tween justice and privilege.
Part V offers an alternative to the liberal defense. The alternative
adopts the more radical view of equality, where the university assumes
responsibility for the conditions produced by societal racism and rede-
fines merit by asking which students will best serve the university's goal of
changing conditions of inequality. It redefines racial diversity by seeking
students whose experiences with and relationship to the phenomenon of
racism are diverse. Ultimately, the best defense of affirmative action chal-
lenges measures of merit that replicate racial privilege and measures
qualification by asking who will contribute to the dismantling of
apartheid.
I. THE VIEW FROM THE Top: THE LIBERAL DEFENSE OF
AFFIRMATrVE AcTION
On October 14, 1997, a white businesswoman named Barbara Grut-
ter filed suit in federal court against various officials of the University of
Michigan and its law school.14 Her complaint alleged that the law school
14. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797, 799 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev'd, 188
F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999). On March 27, 2001, the district court judge ruled that the
University of Michigan's law school violated the Constitution because it took race into
consideration in admissions decisions, despite a contrary outcome in the undergraduate
[Vol. 101:928
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"discriminated" against her on the basis of her race because it maintained
an affirmative action admissions policy that did not apply to her as a
white person. Several months earlier, a similar case, Gratz v. Bollinger, was
brought against the undergraduate college of the University of Michi-
gan.1 5 The two suits are among the latest assaults in a nationwide legal
and political attack on affirmative action that includes Proposition 209,
the referendum measure that outlawed affirmative action in California, 16
and Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit decision that barred affirmative
action at the University of Texas. 17 The Center for Individual Rights
(CIR), the conservative legal organization that successfully overturned af-
firmative action in Texas, represents both of the Michigan plaintiffs. 18
The lawyers at CIR have made clear their intention to pursue the Michi-
gan cases to the Supreme Court. They are confident that the Court will
use this opportunity to overrule Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and
hold unconstitutional any use of race in university admissions. 19
In Bakke, the Supreme Court's last definitive statement on affirmative
action in higher education, Justice Powell reasoned that while racial clas-
sifications were always suspect and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, uni-
versity faculties might use race as one factor among many in order to
promote the "robust exchange of ideas" that might flow from a racially
diverse academic community.20 If CIR succeeds, race-sensitive affirmative
litigation. See Jodi Wilgoren, U.S. Court Bars Race as Factor in School Entry, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 28, 2001, at Al; supra note 8.
15. The district courtjudge decided in favor of the University of Michigan in Gratz on
December 13, 2000. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). However, the future
status of the decision remains unclear. See Jodi Wilgoren, Affirmative Action Plan is
Upheld at Michigan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2000, at A]6 (discussing likelihood that case will
be appealed to the Supreme Court).
16. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-98 (9th Cir. 1997)
(describing Proposition 209).
17. 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
18. CIR describes itself as a "national public interest law firm" dedicated to "the
uncompromising defense of individual liberties." See 1998-1999 Center for Individual
Rights Ann. Rep. 1 (1998-1999). A self-described conservative firm, it has litigated several
precedent-setting cases challenging the constitutionality of affirmative action and has been
a principal force behind several anti-affirmative-action referenda. See id.; John M. Biers,
Conservative Shock Troops Take On Racial Preferences, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 31,
1997, at 3.
19. See Rene Sanchez, Final Exam for Campus Affirmative Action?: White Applicant's
Test of Michigan Admissions Could Set National Policy, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1997, at Al.
20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978). Although Justice
Powell announced the decision, the fractured Court could not produce a majority opinion
and no other justice joined Justice Powell's opinion in full. Five justices signed Part V-C of
Justice Powell's opinion which held that "the State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin." Id. at 320.
20011
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action at public universities will cease 2 ' and those at private universities
will be in jeopardy.22
In its answers to the Grutter and Gratz complaints, the University of
Michigan stated its intention to "continue to use race as a factor in admis-
sions, as part of a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element."23
It is hardly surprising that the University chose to rest its defense squarely
on Justice Powell's diversity rationale. For more than two decades, uni-
versities have relied on "diversity" to justify their affirmative action pro-
grams and defend them against political and legal attacks. But Michigan
has fashioned its defense of diversity with unprecedented thoroughness
and sophistication. Where universities such as California and Texas re-
lied primarily on anecdotal evidence and intuitive reasoning to support
their programs, Michigan has marshaled extensive data on its own stu-
dents and others to demonstrate the benefits of a racially integrated com-
munity, not just to its students, but to society at large.
Michigan has argued that diversity benefits the pedagogic enterprise
because students learn and grow through interaction with difference. Ex-
pert witnesses retained by the university in Gratz v. Bollinger have submit-
ted a broad-ranging empirical study that concludes with a description of
the wide range of benefits that flow from diversity:
Students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity
in classroom settings and informal interactions with peers
showed the greatest engagement in active thinking process,
growth in intellectual engagement and motivation, and growth
in intellectual and academic skills.24
The results of this study also confirm the central role of higher edu-
cation in helping students become active citizens and participants in a
pluralistic democracy. College students who experienced diversity
21. Although a Supreme Court decision rejecting Powell's "diversity" rationale would
abolish affirmative action in its current form, it would not necessarily prevent universities
from engaging in remedial affirmative action or from employing race-neutral criteria to
achieve racial diversity. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
22. See D. Frank Vinik et al., Affirmative Action in College Admissions: Practical
Advice to Public and Private Institutions for Dealing with the Changing Landscape, 26J.C.
& U.L. 395, 417-21 (2000) (reviewing the litigation and public referenda leading the
attack on affirmative action and asserting that private institutions should not assume they
are immune from this attack since Title VI of the Civil Rights Act could be used to
challenge race-based affirmative action at private institutions).
23. Defendant's Answer at 27, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT); Defendant's Answer at 28, Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp.
2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75928-DT).
24. Patricia Gurin, The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, at http:/
/www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/summ.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Professor Gurin used her thirty-four years of
experience in social psychological research and teaching to analyze data from a Michigan
Student Study and nine years' worth of data from a national sample of institutions and
students from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program. Id.
[Vol. 101:928
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showed the most engagement in various forms of civic participation and
the most interaction with people from different races and cultures.
These effects continued after college. Experience with diversity in col-
lege had impressive effects on the extent to which graduates in the na-
tional survey lived racially and ethnically integrated lives. For the first
time, a major university has amassed empirical data to show that segre-
gated education is substandard education. A segregated university pro-
duces students with weaker cognitive skills, less capacity to work and so-
cialize across racial lines, and a less fully developed ethic of civic
obligation and participation. In other words, without racial diversity, the
university could not produce the best and the brightest citizens and lead-
ers for our democracy.
The University self-consciously modeled the shape and substance of
its defense on the work of two prominent academics who have compiled
and analyzed a comprehensive empirical study on affirmative action at
elite colleges and universities, including the University of Michigan. Wil-
liam Bowen and Derek Bok, former presidents at Princeton and Harvard,
published their findings in The Shape of the River: Long Term Consequences
of Considering Race in College and University Admissions,25 a book that
quickly became perhaps the most influential volume on the subject. 2 6
Bowen and Bok make their bias clear from the outset. They believe
that the end of affirmative action would impoverish us all. The book re-
minds us of the segregated world of the academy and the professions that
preceded affirmative action:
In 1965, barely 1 percent of all law students in America were
black, and over one-third of them were enrolled in all-black
schools. Barely 2 percent of all medical students were African
American, and more than three-fourths of them attended two
all-black institutions, Howard University and Meharry Medical
College .27
25. William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term
Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions (1998).
26. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Affirming Affirmative Action, N.Y. Rev. Books, Oct. 22,
1998, at 91 ("It is therefore opportune that the first comprehensive and statistically
sophisticated examination of the actual effects of thirty years of affirmative action in
American universities has just been published."); Martha Ezzard, The Real Meaning of
'Merit': A Book Georgia Policymakers Should Read, AtlantaJ. & Const., Dec. 7, 1998, at
A10 ("The Bowen-Bok book should be required reading for policymakers."); Editorial, The
Facts About Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1998, at A32 ("A new study of elite
colleges provides striking confirmation of the success of affirmative action in opening
opportunities and creating a whole generation of black professionals who are now leaders
in their fields and their communities. No study of this magnitude has been attempted
before."); David Gergen, A Study in Black and White: Why Race-Sensitive College
Admissions Policies Work, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 12, 1998, at 84 ("Their new book,
The Shape of the River, is the most comprehensive study ever done of affirmative action in
higher education, and it demands the attention of anyone who cares about American
universities.").
27. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 5.
2001]
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The authors quote Erwin Smigel's classic study of Wall Street lawyers
in the 1960s. "I only heard of three Negroes who had been hired by large
law firms," reports Smigel. "Two of these were women who did not meet
the client."28 This little history lesson demonstrates that affirmative ac-
tion sought to bring about and, achieved in part, the desegregation of the
academy and higher professions.
The Shape of the River draws on a forty-year longitudinal study of more
than 80,000 black and white students who attended twenty-eight of the
nation's best colleges and universities.2 9 It constitutes an important doc-
ument and a compelling brief for race-sensitive admissions in higher edu-
cation. Their findings hardly surprise many of us who have benefited
from affirmative action as students and teachers.3 0
Bowen and Bok establish that most beneficiaries of affirmative action
feel a strong sense of social responsibility and most go on to contribute to
their communities in meaningful leadership roles.3 1 This evidence shows
that affirmative action in university admissions achieves one of its primary
goals: the education of individuals from under-represented and under-
served minority communities who become leaders within those communi-
ties and spokespersons for the unrepresented. It answers the critics who
have sought to portray the recipients of affirmative action as self-serving
as well as unqualified.3 2
28. Id. at 4.
29. Bowen and Bok's book analyzes a database of records, compiled by the Mellon
foundation, called "College and Beyond." The twenty-eight institutions involved in the
study were: Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Columbia College, Denison University,
Duke University, Emory University, Hamilton College, Kenyon College, Miami University
(Ohio), Northwestern University, Oberlin College, Pennsylvania State University,
Princeton University, Rice University, Smith College, Stanford University, Swarthmore
College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, Williams College, Tufts University, Tulane
University, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, University of North Carolina (Chapel
Hill), University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, and Yale
University. The database contains information about undergraduates who matriculated in
1951, 1976, and 1989. The database records each student's race, gender, high school
grades, SAT scores, college majors and grades, extracurricular activities, graduate and
professional school record, and, for many, family economic and social background. It also
presents information about post-university experience gathered through a detailed
questionnaire. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 291-335.
30. While many black students attending these selective schools would have been
rejected under a strict race-neutral regime, id. at 31-42, the vast majority have been
successful students and have excelled in their professional lives, despite facing continued
discrimination in the workplace. Forty percent of the black graduates who entered the
twenty-eight schools in 1976 went on to earn advanced degrees or professional degrees in
law, business, or medicine, a figure slightly higher than that for their white classmates. Id.
at 97.
31. Id. at 155-73. While black and white matriculants were equally likely to
participate in civic arenas, see id. at 158, "black matriculants (both women and men) were
more likely than white matriculants to be leaders in more than a single civic arena." Id. at
162.
32. See Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White:
One Nation, Indivisible 422 (1997) (arguing Martin Luther King, Jr.'s position dismissing
[Vol. 101:928
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Affirmative action supporters have long understood the necessity of
offering a rejoinder to distorted, but increasingly accepted, images of af-
firmative action beneficiaries. In We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for
Affirmative Action, Professor Mari Matsuda and I presented brief biograph-
ical portraits of several beneficiaries of affirmative action. 3 3 We sought to
remind our readers that many of their own gifted colleagues had walked
through a door pushed open by affirmative action and that we would all
lose were that door slammed shut again. We know from the life stories in
our own circle of family, friends, colleagues, former students, and social
change activists that legions of talented affirmative action beneficiaries
now work in under-served communities as doctors, teachers, lawyers, and
entrepreneurs. They are returning the gifts given to them by speaking
out on behalf of the unheard in board rooms, classrooms, and the halls
and chambers of government. The data in Bowen and Bok's study bears
out our personal experience.3
4
Some minority critics of affirmative action like Justice Clarence
Thomas, Steven Carter, Shelby Steele, and Linda Chavez have com-
plained that affirmative action programs stigmatize and demoralize mi-
norities.35 By contrast, overwhelming numbers of the students in Bowen
affirmative action programs as a poor substitute for "hard work"); cf. Shelby Steele, The
Content of Our Character: A New Vision of Race in America 118-19 (1990) (suggesting
that affirmative action encourages a "victim-focused mentality" among blacks).
33. Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, passim.
34. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 167; see also Steven N. Keith et al., Assessing
the Outcome of Affirmative Action in Medical Schools: A Study of the Class of 1975, at
22-23, 29, 34, 41-42 (1987) (finding that (1) minority medical school graduates work in
primary care rather than specialty practices to a greater extent than their non-minority
counterparts; (2) minority graduates practice in physician-shortage areas at twice the rate
of non-minority graduates; (3) minority graduates care for significantly greater
proportions of ethnic minority patients and patients supported by Medicaid; (4) a smaller
portion of minority graduates enter academic medicine; (5) and only about one-half of
minority graduates obtain board certification in their specialty, compared to four-fifths of
non-minority graduates). The data from the Keith study may also reflect the pernicious
effects of racism, rather than minority graduates' personal choices.
Professor Troy Duster has observed that these studies show that the substitution of
class-based affirmative action for race-based affirmative action will not serve the purpose of
bringing needed medical services to these communities. He argues that poor and working
class white medical school admittees are able to change their class status by virtue of their
medical degree. This ability to assimilate quickly as upper-class whites allows them to
choose high-income medical specialties and practice in hospitals and communities that do
little to serve poor and minority communities. Ironically, the data cited in these studies
represents not just minority commitment to under-served minority neighborhoods but
continuing discrimination against minorities in white neighborhoods and institutions.
Black doctors serve black patients in part because it is difficult for them to get white
patients. Videotape: Remarks of Troy Duster, UC Berkeley Conference, Strategies for
Empowerment: Preserving Diversity in a Post-Affirmative Action World, Panel II: Strength
Through Cooperation: Interdisciplinary and Outreach Initiatives (Apr. 16, 1999) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
35. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority.");
9372001]
HeinOnline -- 101 Colum. L. Rev. 937 2001
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:928
and Bok's study support race-sensitive policies and think that universities
should place more, not less, emphasis on racial diversity.36 They report
that affirmative action not only raised their income and job status, but
enhanced their self-confidence and aspirations with the knowledge that
they could compete with America's best and brightest.3 7 Furthermore,
the status they gained by their association with elite academic institutions
helped to ameliorate the burden of stigma that has its origins in
America's racism. 38
Has the desegregation of the academy taught blacks and whites to
get along better, or has affirmative action only resulted in self-segregation
and greater racial tension? Again, the data supports what those of us who
have lived on these campuses have seen with our own eyes. The vast ma-
jority of black and white students have made good friends across racial
lines.3 9 For most of these students, their first interracial friendships oc-
curred in college. Many of their parents had rarely crossed racial divides.
Affirmative action holds the potential to bridge the deep racial chasm in
a still-segregated nation.
Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby 50 (1991) ("[T]he durable
and demeaning stereotype of black people as unable to compete with white ones is
reinforced by advocates of certain forms of affirmative action."); Steele, supra note 32, at
116 ("[O]ne of the most troubling effects of racial preferences for blacks is a kind of
demoralization, or put another way, an enlargement of self-doubt."); Linda Chavez, Who
Needs the Stigma of Affirmative Action?, Chi. Trib., Feb. 3, 1999, at 15 ("Proponents of
affirmative action don't want to talk about the stigma of affirmative action and some even
deny it exists. But its effects can be every bit as pernicious as old-fashioned racial
prejudice.").
36. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 245-48. "While both whites and blacks are in
favor of increasing the emphasis on diversity, the black matriculants assign this objective a
far greater importance than their white classmates." Id. at 247. In addition, "blacks are
just as likely as whites to attend the most demanding, competitive professional schools ....
They are just as appreciative of their college experience, and they tend to believe that they
gained more from their undergraduate experience than do their white classmates." Id. at
261.
37. Often minorities who have attended the nation's most prestigious institutions
report that they are surprised to discover that while some of their white classmates and
teachers are exceptionally bright or gifted, many others are not remarkable. One of my
students, a young black man who had grown up in Mississippi, said that he had attended
segregated schools throughout elementary school and high school and been the smartest
student in his classes. However, he always believed that the white students in the other part
of town were smarter. He told me that it was not until his first year at Ohio State
University, his first experience on an integrated campus, that he discovered that he was
smarter than most people of all races.
38. For a discussion of the argument that affirmative action stigmatizes people of
color, see Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at 126-29.
39. Eighty-eight percent of blacks report having known well two or more white
students, while 56% of their white classmates say they knew at least two blacks well. Bowen
& Bok, supra note 25, at 231. A 1994 study of more than 6,000 college students reported
that minority students more frequently socialized with students of other races than did
white students. Alice Dembner, Campus Racial Lines May Be Blurring: Study Counters
Notion that Minorities Segregate Selves, Boston Globe, Apr. 5, 1994, at 1.
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None of these observations and arguments supporting race-sensitive
affirmative action in the academy is new, but Bowen and Bok's book gave
them new weight and legitimacy in the legal and political discourse. Even
before the book's release, the press widely reported and discussed its
findings. The authors' status as former presidents of elite Ivy League
schools gave visibility and prestige to the project. One reviewer suggested
that Bowen and Bok wrote the book "with an eye toward [influencing]
today's Supreme Court. ' 40 After all, in Bakke, Justice Powell singled out
Harvard's minority admissions program as a model for constitutionally
permissible race-based admissions. 41 Indeed,judicial deference to the ac-
ademic freedom of university faculties is central to his reasoning in that
case.
42
Moreover, the appeal to science is a powerful tool in the political
and legal discourse about race, 43 and Bowen and Bok situate themselves
as objective empiricists.4 4 The Shape of the River is chock-full of statistics,
graphs, tables, and multivariate regressions. The perceived roles of ideol-
ogy and interest politics as driving forces in the affirmative action debate
have amplified the authority of empirical evidence. The University of
40. Gergen, supra note 26, at 84.
41. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978).
42. Justice Powell opined in Bakke that:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body.
This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body. . . . "It is the business of a
university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment, and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."
Id. at 311-12 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
43. Racists and anti-racists alike have appealed to science in our ancient and ongoing
debate on the question of race and equality. See, e.g., Stephen jay Gould, The Mismeasure
of Man 20-29 (1981) (presenting a historical study of scientific racism from craniology to
hereditary IQ theory); Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life 269-388 (1994) (discussing differing
cognitive ability among ethnic groups in the United States). One of the most famous
examples of the reliance of law and policymaking on social science was the Supreme
Court's use of a study on the impact of segregation on black children's self esteem in Brown
v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954) (citing several social science studies,
including Kenneth B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (1950) (paper delivered at Mid-Century White House Conference on
Children and Youth)).
44. The largely positive critical response to Shape of the River revealed the success of
this strategy. One reviewer began a description of the book's content as follows: "Having
grown weary of debate devoid of empirical evidence, [Bowen and Bok] conducted a study
to determine the truth about race-sensitive practices in the university setting." E.R. Shipp,
Perspective: The Shape of the River, Denv. Post, Oct. 11, 1998, at H3.
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Michigan has recognized the benefit in likewise positioning itself. Of
course, the statistical evidence has more than rhetorical power. It sub-
stantiates the most powerful claims made in favor of affirmative action-
claims that until this time relied primarily on the lived experiences of
those of us who have benefited directly and indirectly from these pro-
grams. The data also refute a number of widely believed myths about
affirmative action. These myths-that affirmative action has lowered edu-
cational standards, hurt minorities more than it has helped them, and
exacerbated rather than relieved racial tension-remain central to the
arguments made by opponents of affirmative action. As Ronald Dworkin
noted in his review of The Shape of the River, those critics must now "either
acknowledge [the authors'] findings or challenge them, and any chal-
lenge must match the standards of breadth and statistical professionalism
that [Bowen and Bok] have achieved." 45
Nevertheless, I remain troubled by another reason for The Shape of the
River's warm reception among liberals and its emergence as the model
for persuading the Supreme Court to affirm the constitutionality of af-
firmative action. While Bowen and Bok occupy the role of "liberals" in
the affirmative action debate, their defense preserves the status quo.4 6 It
leaves no room for deeper criticisms of the racial hierarchy-a hierarchy
that produces unequal secondary education as well as past and ongoing
racism, both deliberate and unconscious, at institutions of higher learn-
ing. I do not mean to suggest that Bowen and Bok are conservatives. I
count them among my liberal allies. However, the "diversity defense" of
affirmative action is, in effect, conservative. Bowen and Bok believe in
racial integration as a moral and pragmatic good, but they defend the
integration of an existing elite without questioning that elite's participa-
tion in the reproduction of institutional racism.
The empirical study, which forms the basis of both The Shape of the
River and the University of Michigan's defense, carefully and powerfully
documents the benefits of diversity. But one must remember that these
studies look only to the nation's most selective colleges and universities.
The studies and resulting conclusions assume that our best schools
should seek first and foremost to educate a select group of influential
scholars, professionals, and world leaders. They imply that not only
should the mission of these institutions remain unchanged, but the
45. Dworkin, supra note 26, at 91-92.
46. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 1874, 1876 (1999) (describing Bowen and Bok's focus on defending existing race-
sensitive admissions practices); Stephen Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on
The Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1583, 1586 (1999) (book review) ("With preferences
on trial, Bowen and Bok have written a brief on . . . behalf [of affirmative action
supporters] designed not only to establish the facts, but to lift the flagging spirits of
preference advocates in the post-Hopwood, post-Proposition 209 era as well."); Gergen,
supra note 26, at 84 ("Now, with an eye toward today's Supreme Court, [Bowen and Bok]
have amassed reams of new social data to support the continued use of race-sensitive
polices in college admissions.").
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means for determining admission to this elite need not change signifi-
candy. The most selective colleges and universities continue to rely heav-
ily on SAT scores in their admissions. 47 Bowen and Bok use the fact that
schools have not lowered their standards to admit minority students as an
argument to support continuing affirmative action. 48 The chief proof
that standards remain high is affirmative action admittees' success as stu-
dents and in the most well-paid and high-status occupations.49
The case for diversity is a case for the integration of a privileged
class. Because the liberal defense of affirmative action accepts the repro-
duction of elites as the primary purpose of selective colleges and universi-
ties, it neither questions the validity of standard admissions criteria used
at these institutions, nor examines the ways that these criteria reinforce
the effects of societal segregation and racism.
It should not surprise us that well-meaning individuals who self-iden-
tify as liberal should be attracted to an argument for racial integration
that least threatens their own privilege. 50 However, the liberal position
on affirmative action is more than a defense mechanism adopted by aca-
demic integrationists. Liberal theory itself guides the rationale. Liber-
alism's focus on fair process and bad actors and its agnosticism toward
continuing conditions of subordination allow the liberal defender of af-
firmative action to champion racial justice without confronting the moral
question of whether he can define as 'just" a society still significantly sep-
47. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1996) (criticizing the continued reliance
on standardized tests); Nicholas Lemann, The Great Sorting, Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1995,
at 84, 99-100 (arguing that use of the SAT achieves mixed results, sometimes at the
expense of students at the bottom of the social structure who are least prepared for the
test).
48. The data show that while blacks as a group scored lower than whites as a group on
standardized tests, the difference in these scores did not mean that blacks were unqualified
for the education they received. Bowen and Bok say that the difference in scores between
black and white applicants to these schools is better explained by the fact that white
applicants are spectacularly well qualified than by the assumption that black applicants
were not qualified. More than 75% of the black applicants in the study had higher math
SAT scores, and more than 73% had higher verbal SAT scores, than the national average of
white test-takers. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 18-19. The average SAT scores of black
entrants to the most selective schools in 1989 was higher than the average of all
matriculants at the same institutions in 1951. Id. at 30. In addition, the authors challenge
the notion that black students would fare better at schools with students who received
comparable SAT scores: "Black students ... with modest SAT scores graduated in larger
numbers from the most selective schools than did those who attended schools in which
their classmates were more like them in terms of SAT scores." Id. at 143.
49. Id. at 128.
50. See Charles R. Lawrence III, "Justice" or "Just Us": Racism and the Role of
Ideology, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 831, 842 (1983) (reviewing David L. Kirp,Just Schools: The Idea
of Racial Equality in American Education (1982)) (discussing the use of ideology as a
defense mechanism against anxiety felt by those who hold power through means and with
motives they cannot comfortably acknowledge).
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arate and unequal. 51 A lawsuit filed against Berkeley makes apparent the
tension in the liberal defense.
II. THE VIEW FROM THE BoTToM: A CHALLENGE To
"COLOR BLIND MERITOCRACY"
On February 2, 1999, Jesus Rios, Gregory McConnell, Justine
Certeza, and five other named individuals filed a class action suit against
the University of California Regents and the University of California (UC)
at Berkeley. Jesus Rios, a Latino, is the son of farm workers. For as long
as he can remember, Jesus worked beside his parents picking apples and
apricots and digging ditches from sunup to sundown. Despite the travails
of migrant life, Jesus graduated from high school in the top four percent
of his class. 5 2 But when Jesus applied to Berkeley, he was told, "You don't
belong here."
Gregory McConnell, an African American, is a Presidential Scholar.
In high school he played soccer and varsity tennis, participated in numer-
ous community service activities, and was a Junior Statesman of
America. 53 When Gregory applied to Berkeley he was told, "You don't
belong here."
Justine Certeza, a Filipina American, will be the first in her family to
graduate from college. In high school, she was sophomore senator, jun-
ior class secretary and senior class president. During herjunior year she
participated on her high school's Academic Decathlon team, which
placed second in Salano County.54 She was also an "A" student. When
Justine applied to Berkeley she was told, 'You don't belong here."
In the year that Berkeley turned down Jesus, Gregory, and Justine,
over 750 other black, Latino and Filipino-American students with simi-
larly superior academic records were denied admission.5 5 Berkeley is the
51. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text; see also Charles R. Lawrence III,
Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 819,
822-28 (1995) [hereinafter Lawrence, Multiculturalism] (arguing that liberal individualist
theory fails the cause of anti-racism and transformative humanization because it offers a
nonsubstantive approach to racism that focuses exclusively on individual harms and
procedural fairness rather than the disestablishment of ideologies, systems, and conditions
of racial subordination).
52. Compl. for Decl. and In. Relief at 4, Rios v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (No. C.99-0525) [hereinafter Rios Complaint].
53. Id.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Press Release, Minority Students Sue U.C. Berkeley for Discrimination:
Admissions Process Violates Federal Civil Rights Laws 2 (Feb. 2, 1999) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Minority Students Sue]. Even comparing only
applicants with grade point averages of 4.0 or higher, African-American, Latino, and
Filipino-American students were denied admission at far higher rates than white students.
Berkeley admitted 48.2% of white applicants with GPAs of 4.0 or higher, but only 31.6% of
Filipino-American, 38.5% of African-American, and 39.7% of Latino applicants with such
GPAs. Id.; First Amended Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at 2, Rios v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. (N.D. Cal. 1999) (No. C99-0525). The plaintiffs in the Rios litigation included
[Vol. 101:928
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UC system's most selective school, and of the 25,796 applicants for the
1999 freshman class, 9,858 had GPAs of 4.0.56 But a white applicant with
a straight "A" average has a much better shot at getting into Berkeley
than a black, Latino or Filipino applicant with the same grades.
57
How could this be? How could a university committed to diversity
exclude so many of the state's brightest and most talented minority stu-
dents? The complaint in Rios reveals a troubling, if unsurprising, answer.
The so-called "color blind" post-affirmative action admissions process at
Berkeley has resurrected the old preferences for the sons and daughters
of the privileged. Let me be more precise: With the end of affirmative
action, it is more apparent than ever that the old-time preferences for
folks who are privileged by race and class have never died. The current
Berkeley admissions process creates a preference for white folks in two
very concrete ways: First, it gives bonus points to high school students
who are enrolled in advanced placement courses; 58 and second, it relies
Filipino-American applicants but not members of other Asian-American groups, who were
admitted to Berkeley at rates comparable to their white counterparts. There is a complex
ambiguity in the position of Asian Americans with regard to affirmative action. Although
Asian Americans have shared with other racial minorities a history of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence inflicted by racism, they are rarely included among the
minority groups targeted by university affirmative action programs. The high test scores of
many Asian Americans often mask the continued exclusion of subgroups within the Asian-
American community, and Asian Americans have experienced a backlash fueled by the
public perception that some universities are admitting "too many Asians." The rhetoric of
anti-affirmative action has employed the image of the Asian-American "model minority" to
argue against the inclusion of Asian Americans in affirmative action programs while
portraying Asian Americans as victims of racial preference. For a progressive response to
the problems posed by interethnic conflict in the context of affirmative action, see
Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at 178-202 (addressing, in part, the complex
relationship between Asian Americans and affirmative action); see also Neil Gotanda,
Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in Asian Americans and the
Supreme Court 1087, 1087-91 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992) (denouncing the "model
minority" myth of Asian Americans, used to both deny the existence of serious
discrimination against Asian Americans and as a racist tool to blame African Americans for
their relative "failure" compared to Asian Americans); Mari J. Matsuda, We Will Not Be
Used: Are Asian Americans the Racial Bourgeoisie?, in Where is Your Body? And Other
Essays on Race, Gender, and the Law 149, 153-54 (1996) (urging Asian Americans to resist
playing the "racial bourgeoisie" role by failing to support affirmative action and calling on
Asian Americans, instead, to support such programs).
56. University of California, Introducing the University-Freshman Profile: All
Programs Except Engineering at http://ucop.edu/pathways/infoctr/introuc/
prof.except.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
57. Comparing applicants to the freshman class admitted for the fall of 1988 with
GPAs of 4.0 or higher, African-American, Latino, and Filipino-American students were
denied admission at far higher rates than white students. Berkeley admitted 48.2% of
white applicants with GPAs of 4.0 or higher, but only 31.6% of Filipino-American, 38.5% of
African-American, and 39.7% of Latino applicants with such GPAs. Rios Complaint, supra
note 52, at 2.
58. Berkeley admits 50% of its entering freshman class based on the academic index
score alone. The remaining 50% of the class is admitted based on academics and other
factors. In 1996 Berkeley adopted a new admissions policy that included the use of
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in a determinative and exclusionary way on insignificant differences in
standardized test scores.59
Advanced placement courses are not available in every California
high school. According to the lawyers representing the Rios plaintiffs, "As
many as twenty-five percent of California's high schools offer no AP
courses whatsoever. Yet some high schools-four percent-offered
twenty-one or more AP courses. Thus, where a student attends high
school plays a very large part in his or her chances of admission to Berke-
ley."'60 In fact, over fifty percent of Berkeley students come from only five
percent of California's high schools.61 When the plaintiffs in the Rios
case examined the racial makeup of California high schools, they discov-
ered that the higher the concentration of black, Latino and Filipino-
American students, the fewer the number of AP offerings.62 Prior to
uncapped grade point averages. An uncapped GPA does not place a ceiling on the total
number of points a student can receive in the calculation of a weighted GPA. A weighted
GPA gives extra points for honors and advanced placement (AP) courses; an "A" in an AP
course on a four-point scale is worth five points. Id. at 11-13. This admissions procedure
was further modified in 1998. Now each applicant would be assigned an "academic" score
and a "comprehensive" score. The academic score is assigned on a scoring scale of one
(highest) to seven (lowest) and is determined based on the admissions readers' assessment
of six academic criteria. At least 75% of the one to seven academic score must be based on
three academic criteria: (1) weighted, uncapped GPA, (2) scores on the SAT (or the ACT)
and three SAT II tests, and (3) college preparatory courses completed and the level of
achievement in those courses, including AP and International Baccalaureate Higher Level
(IBHL). Under the 1998 process, applicants could be assigned an uncapped GPA higher
than 4.0 if they had taken AP, IBHL, or UC-approved honors courses. Id. UCLA uses the
same weighted, uncapped GPA system. Applicants to UCLA in 1998 had an average high
school GPA of 4.19 (on a 4.0 scale). See Complaint at 20, Daniels v. State of California
(Cal. Super. Ct. filedJul. 27, 1999), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/docs/ap-comp.pdf
(last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
59. See Rios Complaint, supra note 52, at 13-14; see also Preliminary Results: Fall
1988 Validity Study 5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that the existing
eligibility indices are "set inappropriately for maximum predictive ability"). For a
discussion of the failures of standardized testing as a predictor of performance or success,
see Sturm & Guinier, supra note 47, at 968-97 (noting that standardized tests do not
reliably identify those applicants who will succeed in college or later in life); see also
Warren W. Willingham et al., Predicting College Grades: An Analysis of Institutional
Trends over Two Decades 10 (1990) (finding that school records provide more accurate
forecast of freshmen GPAs than do test scores); Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criteria:
The Social Science and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1069-80 (1997) (discussing failure of standardized testing in predicting
academic performance of students along racial, ethnic, gender, and age lines); Chris
Jenkins, Study Highlights Disparities in LSAT Scores, The Daily Californian, Oct. 29, 1998
(discussing similar findings with respect to LSAT scores of white and minority law school
applicants with similar GPAs and educational backgrounds).
60. Kimberly West-Faulcon, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Press Conference Statement
(Feb. 2, 1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
61. Minority Students Sue, supra note 55, at 3.
62. Rios Complaint, supra note 52, at 13; see also Cal. Dep't of Educ., Educ.
Demographics Unit, Inequality of Advanced Placement (AP) Opportunity In California
Public Schools 2 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("African American, Latino and
[F]ilipino American public school students have fewer AP opportunities than their white
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1996, the Berkeley admission formula capped GPAs at 4.0, but the cur-
rent policy uncaps GPAs and assigns an extra grade point for grades
achieved in AP courses.63 Many of the 750 Latino, black and Filipino-
American students with 4.0 GPAs who were denied admission to Berkeley
in the fall of 1998 attained the highest possible grades in their school, a
rare and remarkable achievement, but they did not stand a chance in
competition against a student from Beverly Hills or Palo Alto when the
Berkeley admissions policy boosted the other student's straight "A" aver-
age to as much as a 5.0.
The chance to earn a boosted GPA is only the most obvious advan-
tage given to students attending high schools offering AP courses. The
student who takes more AP courses has the additional advantage of learn-
ing information and practicing academic skills that will significantly in-
crease her chances for higher standardized test scores. Furthermore, the
school that offers more AP courses typically has superior resources, such
as higher quality of teaching, lower class size, and more books, labs, and
computers. 64
Berkeley also discriminated against the Rios plaintiffs by relying in a
determinative way on the SAT. Blacks and Latinos have consistently
scored more poorly on these tests than white and Asian-American stu-
dents. An extensive body of research challenges the usefulness of stan-
dardized tests in predicting the performance of poor and minority stu-
dents, and finds that the SAT does a better job predicting the socio-
economic status of the test taker's parents than predicting college per-
formance. 65 Yet, SAT scores often become the decisive factor in admis-
counterparts."); Myriam Marquez, Forget Race or Ethnicity; Just Follow the Money to
Berkeley, Orlando Sentinel, Feb. 5, 1999, at A14 (noting that "[m]ost schools serving a
predominantly minority population offer few, if any, AP courses").
63. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Regents of the University of
California, The New Admissions Policy: Thorough, Flexible, Fair (1997), available at
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/1997/1119/admissions.html (last visited Apr.
12, 2001) (discussing the criteria to be used by the Berkeley admissions committee in the
wake of SP-1 and SP-2-the 1995 regents policy to utilize supplemental criteria in
admissions in lieu of affirmative action). Criteria included the removal of the cap on GPAs
at 4.0, and the unavailability of race and ethnicity as factors for consideration in the
admissions process. Prior to this policy change, Berkeley assigned each applicant an
academic score and a social diversity score, and then arrayed all of those applicants on the
admissions matrix. See Jestis Mena, Impact on Admissions: A Q & A on Admitting
Undergraduates, The Berkeleyan, Aug. 30, 1995, available at http://www.berkeley.edu/
news/berkeleyan/1995/0830/impact.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001).
64. California schools continue to be plagued by vast disparities in wealth and
resources. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 768 (1976) (holding that spending
disparities based on school district wealth violated the California constitution). For a
discussion of continuing inequalities in California public schools despite Serrano, see Hanif
S.P. Hirji, Inequalities in California's Public School System: The Undermining of Serrano v.
Priest and the Need for a Minimum Standards System of Education, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
583, 596-609 (1999); Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools Under State
Constitutional Law, 2 J. Gender Race &Just. 279, 300-13 (1999).
65. See supra note 47.
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sions in a competitive environment like Berkeley, where so many appli-
cants have equally excellent high school grades.
Compare the underlying claim of Rios with those of Bowen and Bok
and the University of Michigan litigation defense. Bowen and Bok as-
sume the validity and neutrality of "regular" admissions criteria and de-
fend small adjustments in those criteria in the name of diversity. The Rios
plaintiffs directly dispute the fairness of criteria such as AP classes and
SAT scores and hold the University responsible for perpetuating the dis-
criminatory practices and conditions of the larger society via the use of
such criteria. On its face, Rios is a constitutional and statutory challenge
to the most obvious manifestations of discrimination in the Berkeley ad-
missions policy,6 6 but by attacking the discriminatory impact of the so-
called "color-blind," "merit-based" system, the suit exposes and demands
an end to systemic, institutional racial preferences.
The title page of the Rios complaint contains a symbolic reference to
the shortcoming of the liberal defense. The Rios lawyers have made sub-
ordinated minority children the plaintiffs in the case, placing the victims
of racism at the center of the issue. The liberal defense focuses on the
benefit to elite institutions and the privileged students who attend them.
Anti-affirmative action forces have successfully employed a strategy that
appropriates the language of "injury," "victimization," and "rights." This
rhetorical move is exemplified in cases such as Bakke and Hopwood where
the parties claiming injury are privileged by white supremacy and where
the victims of societal racism are rendered invisible by the litigation. The
liberal defense fails to directly challenge this conservative tactic. Rather
than refute the assertion that affirmative action privileges minorities and
victimizes whites, the liberal defense responds by saying, "if affirmative
action injures certain white applicants, that injury is justified because
white people benefit from affirmative action too." By contrast, Rios di-
rectly turns the upside down logic of "reverse discrimination" right side
up. The case's caption reflects the reality of racism and gives voice to
those who are really on the bottom.67 There is more than symbolism in
66. The Rios complaint alleges that the University's current admissions policy reflects
impermissible disparate treatment of and has an impermissible disparate impact upon
African-American, Latino, and Filipino-American students by denying them an equal
opportunity to compete for admission. Rios Complaint, supra note 52, at 15-16.
67. Although minorities are directly affected by the outcome of suits challenging
affirmative action programs, courts have often excluded minority participation in these
suits brought by white plaintiffs against white institutions. See Alan Jenkins, Foxes
Guarding the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense of Civil Rights
Remedies, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 263, 282-83 (1999) (citing Hopwood v. Texas, Gratz v.
Bollinger, and other cases in which the district courts denied intervention by minorities who
sought to defend affirmative action programs); Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without
Representation: The Need for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 31, 62-69 (1979); Charles R. Lawrence, When the Defendants are Foxes Too:
The Need for Intervention by Minorities in "Reverse Discrimination" Suits Like Bakke, 34
Guild Prac. 1, 5-19 (1976) (discussing the positive impact intervenors representing
minorities could have had on Bakke); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing,
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this transposition of roles. There is a difference in the substantive claim,
a different view of what constitutes equality, a different remedy re-
quested, and, ultimately, a different conception ofjustice.
The Rios suit reveals a state school system that continues to provide
most young people of color with a separate and unequal education. Cali-
fornia schools remain segregated in fact, if not by law. Non-white chil-
dren are concentrated in the worst of those schools. 68 The Rios plaintiffs'
claim that the state's premier university campus replicates and perpetu-
ates a race-based distribution of educational opportunity and privilege by
choosing to make the very opportunities denied to black, Latino, and
Filipino-American children the prerequisites for admission. No matter
how bright and talented Jesus Rios is, and no matter how hard he has
worked, he cannot inherit the race and class privilege passed on by par-
ents who can move to wealthy white suburbs or pay for fancy private
schools. This suit makes the legal and moral claim that when Berkeley
chooses to make inherited privilege the determining criteria of admis-
sion, it violates Jesus and Gregory and Justine's rights to equal
citizenship. 69
The day the Rios suit was filed, Berkeley Chancellor Robert Berdahl
issued a statement calling the suit's main allegation "false," noting that
Berkeley had made significant efforts to realize a diverse student body but
that the state's ban on racial preferences limited the University: "We
have demonstrated for decades a steadfast resolve to admit and educate
students of all races and ethnicities ... Our resolve has not changed. But
the laws under which we operate have changed."70
What could the Chancellor have meant when he called the suit's cen-
tral claim "false"? Was he contesting a factual allegation-saying that the
80 Cornell L. Rev. 1422, 1422-24 (1995) (arguing that current Supreme Court doctrine is
racially discriminatory in that it allows white plaintiffs standing to challenge racial
inequality in the form of attacks against affirmative action programs but denies standing to
minorities seeking to challenge racial discrimination).
68. Public schools in California are approaching "hypersegregation," with more than
40% of Latino students and 35% of African-American students enrolled in schools with a
90% minority population. A 1999 analysis by the L.A. Times indicates that in Los Angeles
County alone 59% of the Latino high school students are in schools where 90% of the
student body is Latino, Asian-American, or black. Analogously, 50% of the African-
American students are in schools that are 90% or more black, Latino, or Asian-American.
Richard Lee Colvin, School Segregation Is Growing, Report Finds, L.A. Times, June 12,
1999, at Al; see also Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos,
and Unequal Education, in Susan Eaton & Gary Orfield, Dismantling Desegregation: The
Quiet Reversal of Brown v. Board of Education 53, 66-69 (1996) (discussing similar
statistics for other urban areas).
69. To say that Berkeley is legally and morally responsible for its choice to knowingly
reproduce the racially discriminatory distribution of educational opportunity created in
the state's elementary and secondary school system does not exempt the California public
schools from responsibility for correcting those inequalities.
70. Pamela Burdman, Outcry at Universities: Lawsuit Against UC Berkeley Claims
"Color-Blind" Admissions Policy is Unjust, S.F. Chron., Feb. 3, 1999, at A13.
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admission policy does not give extra points for AP courses or heavily
weigh the SAT in the admissions decision? Or did he make a narrow
assertion of legal non-liability-a prediction that, even if the AP policy
were proven to have a discriminatory impact, the current Supreme Court
would hold that it does not violate Title VI or the Equal Protection
Clause? 71 No doubt the University's lawyers will raise both of those de-
fenses, but I suspect that the Chancellor meant to do more than stake out
a narrow legal claim. I think he also made a normative claim-a moral
claim if you will-that the University stands on the side of good and right
and that it is false to accuse it of racism.
Many faculty members at Boalt Hall must have had a similar reaction
to the Trudeau cartoon at the front of this Essay and its implied charge
that they too have participated in maintaining institutional racism. They
must have thought, "it's unfair to imply that we are a segregated school-
to suggest that we are racists. Look at our record. For years Boalt has
had one of the most racially diverse student bodies of all the law schools
in the country. We have been in the forefront of the fight to maintain
affirmative action. Even with the restrictions of Proposition 209, we have
improved our numbers of black and Latino students over the dismal
numbers of 1997."
I believe that both the Chancellor's response to the Rios litigation
and the reactions that I have attributed to my liberal colleagues at Boalt
Hall represent the honest reactions of decent people who are commit-
ted to racial justice. 72 Berkeley's record on this matter does speak for
71. In Bakke five Justices held that, at least with respect to affirmative action, Title VI
only prohibits discrimination based on "those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause." 438 U.S. at 287; id. at 325 (Brennan,J., concurring). A showing
of discriminatory intent is necessary in order to trigger strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment regardless of whether there is disparate impact. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976). This holding of Bakke seemed to conflict with, without expressly
overruling, Lau v. Nichols, which held that a showing of disparate impact could constitute a
violation of Title VI. 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). In Guardians Association v. Civil Service
Commission, once again five Justices held that the Title VI regulations implemented by the
Department of Education (DOE) prohibiting disparate impact discrimination had the
force of law. 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983); id. at 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 644-45
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Given the bare majority in Guardians and the change in
composition of the Court since the holding of that case, it remains to be seen whether the
Court will continue to defer to the DOE's regulations for implementing Title VI. For
further discussion, see Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in Our Nation's Schools, 34
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 517, 534-35 (1999).
72. Philosopher Judith Lichtenberg notes that:
[M]any white Americans... hold to an ideal of equality .... [T]hey feel insulted
[and] baffled by charges that we live in a racist society .... Racism as overt or out-
and-out racism reflects a powerful strain in our attitudes toward moral
responsibility. On this view, you are responsible only for what you intend; thus, if
consciously you harbor no ill-will toward people of another race or background
you are in that respect innocent.
Judith Lichtenberg, Racism in the Head, Racism in the World, Report from the Inst. for
Phil. & Pub. Pol'y, Vol. 12, No. 1, 3 (1992). She contrasts this view held by many people
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itself.73 When I measure Boalt Hall's contribution to racial justice by the
work of its graduates among my own small circle of valued friends and
invaluable colleagues, its impact is impressive. Thelton Henderson, Eva
Patterson, Bill Hastie, Tom Williamson, Richard Delgado, John Powell,
Dale Minami, Eric Yamamoto, and Angela Blackwell are just some of the
extraordinary legal advocates that come immediately to mind.7 4 But the
law school's good works do not relieve it, or us, of our moral responsibil-
ity for the injustices of the larger society or for the privileges that those
injustices afforded us.
The claim in the Rios suit and the Chancellor's response to its charge
of discrimination present examples of how different the river of equality
looks when viewed from the vantage point of those who are subordinated
by America's racism rather than from the vantage point of the privileged.
Liberal theory and the liberal jurisprudence that informs most of legal
doctrine reflect the perspective of the privileged. By contrast, the Rios
who are privileged by oppression with one that holds "racism is not fundamentally a matter
of what is in people's heads or hearts, but rather a function of public institutions and
practices that create or perpetuate racial division and inequality." Id.
73. Since 1997, the numbers of minority students admitted and enrolled at Boalt Hall
have somewhat improved, but the figures are nowhere near their pre-1997 levels. The
numbers of minorities admitted and enrolled at UCLA School of Law have followed a
similar pattern, with an especially dismal figure for black enrollment in 1999. In 2000,
Boalt Hall admitted 28 black students and 7 enrolled; in 1999, 29 black students were
admitted and 7 enrolled; and in 1998, 32 black students were admitted and 8 enrolled. In
2000, 63 Latino students were admitted and 18 enrolled; in 1999, 57 Latino students were
admitted and 16 enrolled; in 1998 60 Latino students were admitted and 23 enrolled. By
contrast, in 1996, 77 black students were admitted of whom 20 enrolled, and 85 Latino
students were admitted, of whom 45 enrolled. University of California's Law Schools,
supra note 2.
Meanwhile, in 2000, UCLA School of Law admitted 13 black students and 5 enrolled;
in 1999, 19 black students were admitted and 3 enrolled; in 1998, 18 black students were
admitted and 8 enrolled. The Latino student population has experienced a similar decline
in representation. In 2000, 72 Latino students were admitted and 28 enrolled; in 1999, 58
Latino students were admitted and 18 enrolled; in 1998, 47 Latino students were admitted,
and 16 enrolled. By contrast, in 1996, 104 black students were admitted of whom 19
enrolled, and 108 Latino students were admitted, of whom 45 enrolled. Id.
74. Thelton Henderson is Chief Judge of United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. Eva Patterson is the Executive Director of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and Co-Chair of Californians for
Affirmative Action. Bill Hastie was one of the founding attorneys of Public Advocates as
well as of Arnelle & Hastie, at one time the second-largest black law firm in the country.
Tom Williamson is the second African-American to become a partner at Covington &
Burling; he was Solicitor of Labor from 1992-1996. Richard Delgado is a Jean Lindsley
Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law, and a noted critical legal
scholar. John Powell is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School and
Executive Director of the Institute on Race and Poverty. Dale Minami is a founding
member of the Asian Law Caucus and was a key figure in procuring reparations for
Japanese-Americans interned by the federal government during the Second World War.
Eric Yamamoto is Professor of Law at the University of Hawaii Law School. Angela
Blackwell is the President and founder of Policy Link, a national institution devoted to
advancing policies and practices that improve low-income communities.
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suit is grounded in antisubordination theory, a theory that takes the van-
tage point of those who are victimized by societal racism.
Liberal theory focuses on guarding the liberty of an autonomous,
disconnected human being. It holds that "power should be exercised in
accordance with the rule of law, that government should recognize and
respect rights, and that freedom, rather than equality, should be the
highest political value. ' '75 Liberal legality sees the equality principle as
primarily concerned with protecting individuality, and views racial dis-
crimination as unjust because when we judge a person based on her race
we disregard her unique human individuality. For the liberal legal theo-
rist, racism consists of isolated prejudicial discriminatory practices in an
otherwise nondiscriminatory world. Identifiable perpetrators who have
purposefully or intentionally caused harm to identifiable individual vic-
tims violate the moral and constitutional command of equality, not his-
torical or institutional conditions of group subordination. The Chancel-
lor's denial reflects this narrow definition of harm and culpability. The
charge of racial discrimination is deemed false. While there may be un-
fortunate conditions of inequality in the world, Berkeley cannot be held
responsible for them. The perspective of the privileged denies history. It
makes an abstract moral claim to equal treatment unsullied by history or
social reality.76
Like the Berkeley chancellor's response to the Rios suit, the liberal
defense of affirmative action is grounded in liberal theory. Rather than
defend affirmative action as necessary to insure equal opportunity in a
world where a variety of social structures, institutional practices, and un-
conscious racist beliefs conspire to deny minorities equal consideration
and respect, the liberal defense justifies diversity as a way to help privi-
leged whites better understand people of color in a nation that may soon
have a non-white majority. This social utility argument leaves in place our
current measures of merit and defends minor adjustments in those mea-
sures because racial integration of elite universities and professions will
benefit the community as a whole.
Critics of liberal theory, including critical race theorists, have offered
another way to think about promoting equality and human dignity, one
75. Austin Sarat, Going to Court: Access Autonomy and the Contradictions of Liberal
Legality, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 97, 97-111 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998); see also Roberto Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social
Theory 176-81 (1977) (describing and expressing skepticism towards liberal theory's
account of the relationship between autonomy and the rule of law); Robin West, Caring
for Justice 4 (1997) (criticizing mainstream liberal theory for emphasizing individual
autonomy over "the connections that sustain and enlarge us").
76. See generally Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev.
1049, 1052-54 (1978) (arguing that civil rights law in the twenty-five years after Brown has
served more to rationalize the continuing effects of discrimination than to produce any
genuine liberation from race and class oppression).
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that reflects the perspective of the subordinated. 77 Consider the constitu-
tional and moral command of equal protection as one requiring the elim-
ination of society's racism rather than mandating equal treatment as an
individual right. Critical race theorists have called this theory "substan-
tive equality" or "antisubordination" theory. Such a substantive approach
assumes that ridding society of racial subordination is indispensable and
a prerequisite to individual dignity and equality. It understands that
white supremacy continues to exist and hurts us all. 78 Critical race theory
focuses on the persistence of conditions created by and traditionally asso-
ciated with racist practice. Racism as traditionally practiced led to dis-
criminatory exclusions from employment, from "white" neighborhoods,
from politics, from government contracts, and from universities like
Texas, Michigan, and Berkeley. If those same conditions of exclusion ex-
ist in virtually identical form after antidiscrimination laws have prohibited
overt racial discrimination, the law has not yet done its job. From the
perspective of those who are subordinated, those conditions are pre-
sumptive violations. The Rios suit speaks from the vantage point of the
subordinated. The Trudeau cartoon asks the reader to see Boalt Hall
through the same lens. The absence of blacks should be treated for
moral purposes as intentional. "We no longer admit black people."
The original vision of affirmative action proceeded from the perspec-
tive of the subordinated. The students and community activists who
fought for affirmative action in the 1960s and '70s understood that racism
operated not primarily through the acts of prejudiced individuals against
77. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003, 1007 (1986) (arguing for an anti-subordination perspective that
utilizes a group-based approach to eliminate the power disparities between whites and non-
whites and between men and women as it is "inappropriate for certain groups in society to
have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole"); KimberlM
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1336 (1988) (suggesting the need to
move beyond existing antidiscrimination law as it has allowed black material subordination
to be perpetuated, and because we need to make a "societal commitment to the
eradication of the substantive conditions of Black subordination"); see also Freeman, supra
note 76, at 1118 (making the case for the subordinated group through what he calls the
"victim perspective"). See generally bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center
(1984) (arguing that viewing society and life from the "margin" provides important
insights not available to those viewing society from the center).
78. Elsewhere I have contrasted this transformative or substantive approach to racial
equality with that of liberal individualist theory:
The substantive approach sees the disestablishment of ideologies and systems of
racial subordination as indispensable and prerequisite to individual human
dignity and equality. The nonsubstantive approach sees the individual right to be
treated without reference to one's race as primary .... [E]ach approach defines
the injury of racism differently. The theory that places the right with the
individual likewise sees the injury as one suffered by individuals. The theory that
seeks societal transformation sees the injury as done to the collective, as suffered
by us all.
Lawrence, Multiculturalism, supra note 51, at 824-25.
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individuals of color but through the oppression of their communities. It
was not enough to remove the "White" and "Colored" signs from lunch
counters, buses, and beaches. Institutionalized racism operated by deny-
ing economic resources, education, political power, and self-determina-
tion to communities of people defined by race. 79 When they demanded
affirmative action-when they sat-in and sued and took over buildings
and went on hunger strikes and closed down universities-they sought
redress for their communities. Their demand for affirmative action was
part of a broad vision of a just university. They demanded an end to
university expansion that forced poor people out of housing. They
sought courses and research that addressed community needs. They de-
manded the admission of students and the hiring of faculty who identi-
fied with the excluded-not just people who shared their skin color or
language, but individuals who would represent and give voice to those
persons who were ignored, misrepresented, or objectified in traditional
scholarship.8 0 Many of today's progressive student activists share the vi-
sion that guided affirmative action's radical advocates a generation ear-
lier. The students organizing to repeal the anti-affirmative action amend-
ment in California and those who have intervened in the Michigan case
want more than the reinstitution of liberal affirmative action. They are
demanding that universities discontinue practices that reinforce societal
discrimination and act affirmatively to alleviate conditions of poverty and
human suffering in communities of color.
The liberal defense of affirmative action does more than buttress the
structure of race and class subordination. It also participates in the pro-
duction of an ideology that justifies the re-segregation of the academy in
the name of equality. Justifications for affirmative action are often di-
vided into two main types. Arguments that focus on past and continuing
discrimination against minorities, women and other groups are often
called "backward-looking." They argue for affirmative action to make
amends for or to rectify the effects of past injustices. By contrast, "for-
ward-looking" arguments for affirmative action make sparing reference to
past or current wrongdoing, and instead defend affirmative action as a
means to some desirable future goal.81 The liberal or "diversity" defense
79. See Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at 13, 17.
80. For a description of the historical origins of this more radical vision of affirmative
action and an account of the student movement that resisted the backlash against
affirmative action, see id. at 11-58.
81. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 80 (1986) (arguing that Supreme Court has only approved
affirmative action as remedy for past discrimination, but has refused to justify it as path to
racially integrated future). For an influential version of the forward-looking approach, see
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 32 (1978). For an argument sharply critical of
the forward-looking approach, see 2 George Sher, Diversity, Philosophy & Public Affairs 28
(1999) (arguing that the advantages of "forward looking" justifications for "preferential
treatment" are "illusory" in that they turn on "tacit appeals to past wrongdoing"). For an
argument that the most coherent and defensible justification of affirmative action is both
[Vol. 101:928
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articulates its purpose as "forward-looking" rather than "backward-look-
ing." In so doing, it begins with an implicit denial of the defender's par-
ticipation in or responsibility for past or contemporary racism. The uni-
versity seeks to prepare its students for future participation and
leadership in a racially diverse society and expresses no interest in repara-
tions. By looking only forward, it avoids any direct admission or acknowl-
edgement of the institution's past discriminatory practices, 82 even when
that discrimination is de jure and of relatively recent vintage.83 It makes
no effort to inquire into the ways that current facially neutral practices
may have a foreseeable and unjustifiable discriminatory impact or to ac-
count for unconscious bias in their administration.8 4 This denial concurs
in and reiterates "the big lie,"8 5 the anti-affirmative action argument that
pretends that white supremacy is extinct and presupposes a color-blind
world, a world in which race-conscious remedies become invidious dis-
forward-looking and backward-looking, see Lawrence, Race and Affirmative Action, supra
note 9, at 765-66.
82. By denying past and present discrimination, the university also gives up its
strongest legal defense to a reverse discrimination claim. See Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefanic, California's Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious
Decision-Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1521, 1529-30 (2000) (asserting
that the rationale for affirmative action as a way to remedy past discrimination still survives
Hopwood, but evidence of past discrimination must be specific and particularized); Daria
Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 10 La Raza LJ. 363,
412 (1998) (asserting that evidence of past discrimination in law school admissions and
institutional history of discrimination can demonstrate compelling state interest in
remedying past discrimination).
83. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554-57 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(documenting history of de jure segregation in educational system in Texas, from its
resistance to integration polices demanded by Brown, to more recent decision in 1983 in
which the District Court of Columbia ruled in a Title VI enforcement suit that "Texas has
still not committed itself to the elements of a desegregation plan which in the defendant's
judgment complies with Title VI"). In 1994, the Office of Civil Rights continued to oversee
Texas's efforts to "eliminate all effects of de jure segregation." Id. at 557.
84. See, e.g., William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSAT,
Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 Tex. J. Women & L., 167,
169-71, 217-18 (2000) (arguing that conventional definition of test bias-the "linear
regression model"-can actually mask bias by relying on criterion (law school grades) that
also may be contaminated by bias against women, people of color, and other outsider
groups); Olivas, supra note 59, at 1069-74 (arguing that common admissions practice of
reliance on test scores is not an objective or race-neutral process); see also Ass'n of Am.
Law Schs., Perspectives on Diversity: AALS Special Commission on Meeting the
Challenges of Diversity in an Academic Democracy (1997) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing "second-generation" diversity issues); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 47,
at 958 (suggesting that underlying current selection and admissions processes may not
function fairly for anyone, and urging a new dialogue using race- and gender-based
inquires to rethink selection measures as a whole). Intervenors in the University of
Michigan litigation cite several studies documenting the continuing racial isolation and
hostile environment faced by students of color and women at Michigan and other colleges
and universities. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 9 n.14, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (No. 97-CV-75928-DT).
85. Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at 69-87.
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crimination. 86 Unlike those who perpetrate the big lie in order to justify
their opposition to affirmative action, the liberal defenders do not ex-
pressly deny the presence of past or current racial discrimination. In-
stead they claim disinterest in either, arguing that it is more fruitful and
less divisive to focus on the future than to stir the ashes of a troubled past.
But the effect is much the same. The liberal defense is framed as if there
is no structural discrimination to remedy. It does not challenge the fair-
ness or rationality of conventional selection processes or standards of
merit. Instead, it tells a story of a foresighted university committed to
integration for the sake of diversity, not corrective justice. It is a defense
that begins on the day the affirmative action policy was initiated, ignoring
the university's long history of de jure and de facto segregation;87 segre-
gation that continued until disruptive student protests and the fires of
urban rebellions forced a change. 88
It is this implicit participation in the big lie that allows liberal faculty
at Berkeley, UCLA, and Texas to see themselves as fully committed to
affirmative action, even as they throw up their hands and say, "We are
helpless" in the face of Proposition 20989 and the Fifth Circuit's decision
86. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (holding that
there was "no direct evidence of race discrimination" against minority subcontractors).
87. The District Court in Hopwood found that as recently as 1960, the University of
Texas had segregated Mexican-American students in campus housing and assigned them
to a dormitory known as "the barracks," and that until the mid-1960s, a Texas Board of
Regents policy prohibited blacks from living in or visiting white dorms. 861 F. Supp. at
555.
88. See Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at 18-29 (discussing the role of student
protest and urban uprisings in motivating universities to initiate affirmative action
programs).
89. Although university faculty claim that their hands are tied by court orders and
legislation barring the use of race in admissions, they have also demonstrated a reluctance
to aggressively pursue alternatives aimed at maintaining racially diverse student bodies.
For example, in May of 1997, in the wake of Proposition 209, a group of nine Berkeley law
and graduate students authored a report and proposal which critiqued the current
admissions policy at Boalt Hall and offered an alternative admissions strategy designed to
bring students of diverse backgrounds to the law school. Cecilia U. Estolano et al., New
Directions in Diversity: Charting Law School Admissions Policy in a Post-Affirmative
Action Era (May 9, 1997) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The proposal called for a
four step plan to correct the inequities in Boalt's existing admissions policies: 1) the
creation of a "Character Index" that "would include variables to measure an applicant's
individual attributes, such as family wealth and parental education as well as neighborhood
factors, such as poverty rates and the educational attainment of an applicant's high school
peers"; 2) the integration of alumni interviews in the admissions process; 3) greater
outreach to underrepresented communities; 4) the elimination of hidden preferences by
using race to measure "experiential diversity." Id. at i-iii. This final policy was framed as a
remedy to the disparate impact on people of color and preference to whites that is
occasioned by Boalt's heavy reliance on the LSAT. Id. at 67-71. The Boalt faculty rejected
the proposal, arguing that it would be held unlawful by the courts. They also rejected the
alumni interview proposal despite an offer by the San Francisco Bar Association to fund all
costs, recruit alumni interviewers, and administer the program. Telephone Interview with
Drucilla Ramey, Director, San Francisco Bar Association (June 15, 2000).
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in Hopwood.9°) So long as university faculties remain indifferent to the
continuing legacy of their own past discriminatory practices or the ways
in which current admission policies unjustifiably reinforce contemporary
racial discrimination, they need not face up to their own active participa-
tion in the maintenance of race and class privilege.
For example, when Grutter v. Bollinger, the suit challenging the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program, was first
filed, many people encouraged the University to admit and carefully doc-
ument its own historical and contemporary discrimination against Afri-
can-Americans and other minority students.91 This seemed the Univer-
sity's safest and most straightforward strategy. The Court's opinions in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.92 and Adarand v. Pena93 had made it
clear that the remedy of identified past and continuing discrimination
was a compelling state interest and that a racial classification, narrowly
drafted to serve that interest, would survive strict scrutiny.94 The fate of
90. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); see supra note 89 (describing how
faculties have rejected race-neutral alternatives that might have maintained level of
minority admissions).
91. See, e.g., Kerry Colligan, Panelists Discuss History of Affirmative Action, Lawsuit,
Univ. Rec., Nov. 26, 1997, at 6 (reporting on part of a student-sponsored, four-evening
symposium entitled, "Affirmative Action 101: Understanding the Controversy," at which a
panelist argued that affirmative action is necessary to "compensate for a history of slavery
and systemic racial discrimination"); Bernie DeGroat, AAAJS Affirmative Action March,
Diag Rally Draw Students, Faculty, Staff, Univ. Rec., Jan. 28, 1998, at 6 (reporting on rally
on the University of Michigan campus at which faculty members called upon
demonstrators to fight for affirmative action to combat institutional racism endemic to our
society); Paula Saha, Panel Presents Perspectives on Diversity in Higher Education, Univ.
Rec., Nov. 26, 1997, at 6 (reporting on "Affirmative Action 101: Understanding the
Controversy," at which panelist Earl Lewis, University of Michigan Professor of History and
of Afro-American and African History and Interim Dean of the Graduate School, argued
that "history matters," and history is a supportive rationale for affirmative action
programs).
92. 488 U.S. 469, 470-74 (1989) (striking down Richmond's plan requiring prime
contractors awarded city construction contracts to sub-contract at least 30% of the dollar
amount to one or more minority business enterprises).
93. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that federal program designed to provide
highway contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises must withstand strict scrutiny).
94. The majority in Adarand held:
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality,
and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it .... When race-
based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within
constitutional constraints if it satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set
out in previous cases.
Id. at 237. In Croson, the Court held, "Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially
become a 'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the
local construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to
dismantle such a system." Croson, 488 U.S. at 492; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
82, at 1529-30 (arguing that as a result of Croson, plaintiffs claiming discrimination in
higher education settings will have to demonstrate via evidence with "high credibility" that
"past discrimination [was] specific and particularized, not merely societal and general");
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the diversity defense standing alone was at best unsettled. 95 The Univer-
sity's strongest case was one that combined the remedial justification with
the diversity defense.9 6 The University rejected this suggestion, relying
instead on the diversity defense alone.
Perhaps the University's rejection of the remedial defense can be
explained by its concern that by admitting its own discriminatory prac-
tices it would expose itself to liability vis-a-vis minority applicants and stu-
dents.97 However, many cities and governmental agencies have adopted
a preemptive approach to defending affirmative action programs by care-
fully documenting the continuing effects of their past discriminatory
practices.98 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has implicitly, if not
Roithmayr, supra note 82, at 412 (arguing that broad remedial affirmative action in
admissions policies may be possible "on grounds that the selection process itself is
intrinsically and structurally discriminatory").
95. See Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative
Action in University Admissions, 32 Akron L. Rev. 181, 203-05 (1999) (arguing that
Hopwood decision is illustrative of lack ofjudicial restraint, as the Fifth Circuit prematurely
overruled Justice Powell's diversity rationale in Bakke and "ignored the special
consideration the Supreme Court has traditionally accorded education," by relying on
precedents that are not related to education); Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal,
Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1768 (1996) ("The Court ... [has] nowhere explicitly
overruled Bakke, and so, under well established general principles, it clearly remains
binding precedent for all lower courts, state and federal."); Jim Chen, Diversity and
Damnation, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1839, 1851 (1996) (noting the Fifth Circuit's "startling
rejection of prevailing legal wisdom" in holding that "diversity as a governmental interest is
not sufficiently compelling to justify race-conscious law school admissions").
96. The intervenors suggest that the Regents of the University of Michigan are
permitted under the Fourteenth Amendment to use race-conscious admissions "to remedy
... the continuing effects of past discrimination that [the University] has caused and its
own current discrimination," as well as to further "a compelling interest in diversity."
Defendant-Intervenor's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4, 2, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-
CV-75231-DT). However, the University's defense rests solely on Justice Powell's diversity
rationale, leaving out a potentially powerful defense tool. Defendant's Answer at 18, 19,
22, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT).
97. See Motion to Intervene at 18, Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich.
1998) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT) (pointing out that although race-conscious action could be
upheld on remedial grounds, providing the necessary evidence might be in tension with
the University's interest in avoiding liability for discrimination). In United Steel Workers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), Justice Blackmun noted the "catch-22" faced by
defendants in anti-affirmative action cases. "[O]n the one hand they face liability for past
discrimination against blacks, and on the other they face liability to whites for any
voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior discrimination against
blacks." Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
98. More than 140 state and local jurisdictions have commissioned "disparity studies"
used to justify their Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) ordinances since the Croson
decision. George R. La Noue, Who Counts? Determining the Availability of Minority
Businesses for Public Contracting After Croson, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 793, 797-805
(1998) (also discussing the effectiveness of disparity studies and other methods
jurisdictions could employ to justify MBE ordinances). See generally George R. La Noue,
Minority Business Programs and Disparity Studies: Responding to the Supreme Court's
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expressly, indicated its own approval of such an approach.9 9 The Univer-
sity's reluctance to admit past and present discrimination is better ex-
plained by the faculty's and administration's reluctance to examine and
admit their own participation in racism and to give up the advantages the
current system affords them. 0 0
By contrast, the underlying moral claim of the Civil Rights Move-
ment' 0 ' and of the demand for affirmative action that grew therefrom,
contested the university's historic role as palace guard for the power
elite.1°2 It challenged the university to make racial justice central to its
mission and to expand its constituency to include those most in need.
Great universities like Yale, Chicago, and Columbia were asked to look
out at the blocks surrounding their campuses, where human suffering
and urban decay stood as a challenge to the greatest intellects of the day:
Will you stand by in silence or will the university become a place of intel-
lect committed tojustice? Many liberals first supported affirmative action
in response to that moral challenge. They understood its threat to their
privilege, and, nonetheless, were persuaded by the moral imperative of
the more radical claim for equality. I think the current liberal defense is
not a rejection of that once tentatively embraced moral claim, but a back-
Mandate in City of Richmond v. Croson (1994) (providing a discussion of and step-by-step
guide to commission, completion, and use of a disparity study).
99. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (1989). But see
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a law school may not
take race into account in admissions despite evidence of significant past and ongoing
discrimination against minorities in the state's educational system); Podberesky v. Kirwan,
38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994) (striking down use of race-based scholarships because
evidence of minority underrepresentation, low retention rates of minority students, and
hostile racial campus environment did not sufficiently show present effects of past
discrimination).
100. The offspring of university faculty are particularly advantaged in the current
admissions structure. The children of academics who grow up surrounded by books and
adults who are part of an intellectual community are even more likely to do well on SATs
and advanced placement tests than the children of wealthier parents who are not
academics.
101. 1 use the term "Civil Rights Movement" here to refer to the larger liberation
movement among subordinated people of color in the United States for political self-
determination and control of resources within their own communities as well as for access
to institutions of power and influence such as universities. For an account of the history of
affirmative action's origins in the Civil Rights Movement, see Lawrence & Matsuda, supra
note 10, at 11-40.
102. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite 62-70 (1956) (discussing role of elite
educational institutions as custodians and curators for the traditions of the wealthy,
ensuring the smooth transfer of social and political power to the sons and daughters of the
privileged); see also Roithmayr, supra note 82, at 389-93 (describing how law school
admission standards have historically denied immigrants and persons of color entry into
legal profession, and asserting that the same intentionally biased standards still dominate
the practice today); David M. White, The Definition of Legal Competence: Will the Circle
Be Unbroken?, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 641, 648-49 (1978) (discussing how law school and
bar examination criteria act as exclusionary measures to limit access to the practice of law,
leaving bar composed primarily of affluent white males).
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sliding in the name of pragmatic politics. It is a backsliding rationalized
by the doctrine of formal equality. In a world where law is increasingly
made on the premise that the market produces just results, it is easy to
forget that we are all our brothers' and sisters' keepers. 10 3
Ultimately, by failing to examine how conventional procedures and
standards for admissions reinforce race and class subordination, the lib-
eral defense leaves unchallenged a definition of the university's primary
mission as gatekeeper for and producer of a professional elite. This fail-
ure to address systemic racism leaves the liberal defense with an inade-
quate response to the central criticisms of affirmative action. Emphasiz-
ing the importance of diversity conveniently sidesteps the debate over
whether our institutions are truly meritorious. By avoiding that question,
the diversity defense remains vulnerable to the right-wing attack that af-
firmative action endangers the continuing success of our schools by sub-
stituting for fairness and hard work a principle of vague importance.
III. A CRITICAL RACE THEORIST's DILEMMA
How should a critical race theorist respond to the liberal defense of
affirmative action? Can it be reconciled with the more radical "original
vision" that I describe above?' 0 4 Is there no common ground upon which
liberal and radical defenders of affirmative action can meet and join
forces?
Certainly, strong strategic reasons for supporting the liberal defense
of affirmative action exist. In the short run, Bowen and Bok have charted
the course that will most likely succeed in today's judicial and political
climate. 1° 5 If there is any hope that the current Supreme Court will up-
103. See, e.g., Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal
Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 817, 845-872 (1986)
(criticizing law and economics movement's proposition that individual desire to maximize
wealth is benevolent and poses no moral or social dangers).
104. Elsewhere I have referred to this more radical vision as the "deep meaning" of
affirmative action. See Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 775-78 (acknowledging that
diversity in education benefits everyone affected, but also criticizing the diversity argument
for failing to see that the "forward-looking" benefit of affirmative action must also be
informed by historical and contemporary racism); Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at
26-29.
105. Current Supreme Court doctrine requires that any affirmative action program be
"narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination" in order to survive strict
scrutiny. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989). Generalized
assertions of past discrimination would not be enough to justify an affirmative action
policy. Litigants defending affirmative action would have to point to specific
discriminatory policies and procedures that had an adverse impact on minorities. Id. at
498. In this context, a diversity defense of affirmative action would seem doomed to fail,
except that as Professors Akhil Amar and Neal Katyal have pointed out, Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy may take a different approach to affirmative action in the educational
context were the Court to revisit Bakke. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 95, at 1769-71.
Though they have elsewhere expressed opposition to affirmative action, both Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy take caution to uphold precedent. Id. In addition, Amar and
[Vol. 101:928
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hold a race-conscious university policy-whether in admissions, scholar-
ships, or the employment of faculty-it lies in persuading the center of
the Court that it can trust university faculties and administrators to deter-
mine how best to maintain America's premier academic institutions and,
implicitly, the existing elite-school power and privilege that has served
people like the justices themselves. Institutional autonomy lies at the
center of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. The opinion's doctrinal rea-
soning sounds in the First Amendment right to speech and academic
freedom, 10 6 arguing that the judiciary must grant faculties autonomy in
making admissions decisions in order to preserve academic autonomy of
thought.' 0 7 Powell understood that an educated elite who shared his val-
ues and sense of nobless oblige would exercise this autonomy.1~11 Pow-
ell's Bakke opinion contains a subtext that reads roughly as follows: "We
must integrate the university because lily-white institutions will lose legiti-
macy among excluded groups, with potentially destabilizing conse-
quences for a democratic system. Future elites must learn to govern in an
increasingly diverse society and an increasingly globalized, largely non-
white world. University faculties occupy the best position to determine
whether and to what extent schools require the admission of minorities
and to decide which minorities are best suited to serve the important
purpose of maintaining the status quo." The risk of a Supreme Court
decision that abandons Bakke and prohibits any use of race-sensitive af-
firmative action in the academy is hardly trivial. I have criticized Justice
Powell's reasoning for its conservatism, but its rationale will likely prove
most attractive to the current Supreme Court. For this reason alone it
should not be lightly set aside.
The liberal defense of affirmative action provides the best legal strat-
egy precisely because it promises most effectively to preserve the status
quo. It is also true that the status quo under current affirmative action
regimes has much worth preserving. I know, for example, that I have a
significant personal stake in the world liberal affirmative action has cre-
Katyal believe that as long as affirmative action in the educational context is based on race
as one consideration among many, as opposed to a rigid quota, the Court may be willing to
recognize that diversity in education is a compelling interest and a positive end in itself.
Id. at 1772-79; see also Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 764 n.27 (critiquing "Amar
and Katyal's otherwise powerful argument" because it does not recognize that "our
nation's historical and contemporary racism must be a primary subject of our
conversation").
106. See Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 770-71
107. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 Yale L.J. 251, 314-16 (1989) (arguing that Justice Powell's reliance on
the First Amendment is supported by a strong tradition of academic autonomy in the
pursuit of educational goals and is not merely an attempt to provide an acceptable way to
preserve affirmative action while condemning racial preferences). But see Lawrence,
Harvest, supra note 13, at 770-75 (critiquing Justice Powell's First Amendment argument).
108. For a discussion of how Archibald Cox reminded the justices of their shared
membership in an educational elite during his oral argument in Bakke, see Joel Dreyfuss &
Charles Lawrence III, The Bakke Case: The Politics of Inequality 172-202 (1979).
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ated. 10 9 I have come to count on the enriching experience of teaching
classes in which African-American, Latino, Asian-American, and white stu-
dents do the hard work of learning from and about one another.1 10 I
know that many of the bright young people of color who have been my
best students were admitted to law school under the very affirmative ac-
tion programs I have criticized as elitist. The law schools where I have
taught considered them attractive candidates because their experience as
subordinated minorities served the faculty's pedagogical interest in a "ro-
bust exchange of ideas," and, perhaps even more importantly, because
these individuals had, somewhere along the way, acquired the skills and
sensibilities that only come from access to privilege.II
I want to convey the full complexity of my dilemma. I have criticized
the liberal defense of affirmative action as a means of entrenching a privi-
leged elite, but the increased racial integration of the new elite class and
of elite institutions is a significant social achievement. Diversity can be
defended on moral and ethical grounds because it produces a positive
good rather than being merely instrumental to the end of antisubordina-
tion. In a racially integrated classroom or university community we get to
109. The world I refer to here is that of the relatively elite law schools where I have
taught during the past fifteen years (Stanford, Georgetown, Harvard, USC, UCLA, and
Berkeley). These law schools, and other comparable schools, have realized racially diverse
student bodies and somewhat less diverse faculties under the affirmative action policies
and practices that have resulted from and are defended by the liberal argument I describe
in Part I. For a discussion of how the ideal of affirmative action as a vehicle for community
power was transformed to a mechanism for co-optation, see Lawrence & Matsuda, supra
note 10, at 24-26.
110. I have omitted the mention of American-Indian students here in the interest of
accuracy. In twenty-five years of teaching at seven different law schools I have taught only
three American-Indian students. My experience reflects the overall data on American-
Indian enrollment in American law schools which can only be described as bleak. For
example, last year at Boalt Hall American Indians represented only .5% of those students
enrolled on a full time basis. UCLA did not fare any better, with American Indians
representing .5% of its enrollment. Rick Morgan & Kurt Snyder, Official American Bar
Association Guide to Approved Law Schools 116-23 (2000).
111. The irony of defending affirmative action at elite law schools like Boalt Hall and
Michigan is that there is really very little affirmative action to defend. The attack on
affirmative action is premised on the assertion that unqualified minorities are being
preferred over whites with superior qualifications, but the bottom line of the data in
Bowen and Bok's study is that the best schools simply do not sacrifice the "quality" of their
students to achieve racial integration. See Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 100-02. I am
always struck by how many of the black students I encounter at the best law schools have
also attended elite undergraduate institutions. Not all of these students come from
families who are privileged by class or education, but almost without exception they have
had the good fortune of finding their way to educational institutions where the sons and
daughters of the privileged are educated. The criticism that race-based affirmative action
only benefits the most privileged minorities is one that is often made by opponents of
affirmative action. For a discussion calling for an expansion of affirmative action to
include those who are subordinated by poverty while retaining important elements of
affirmative action directed at remedying racism, see Lawrence & Matsuda, supra note 10, at
178-202.
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know people who are different from ourselves as whole people. When we
form close and enduring friendships with individuals who are unlike our-
selves, we further an ethic of humanity and human connection. Affirma-
tive action has made law schools different and better places. The Univer-
sity of Michigan defends its affirmative action program by demonstrating
that a racially diverse campus is essential to the education of students who
have grown up in racially segregated communities and who come to col-
lege with few friends of other races.1 12 This argument is compelling even
in the context of privilege. Students of color who are privileged by class
or educational background nonetheless experience subordination by
ubiquitous societal racism. 113 They bring to the classroom and to the
larger intellectual discourse an understanding of subordination that
those privileged by white supremacy do not necessarily share. This knowl-
edge is critical to the educational enterprise if the academy is to fulfill a
moral commitment to anti-racism.1 1 4
It continues to be my experience that middle-class students of color
come to law school with a deep sense of responsibility for and commit-
ment to the struggle against race and class subordination. The parents of
many of my black students remember the "White" and "Colored" signs of
the segregated south and the urban uprisings of the 1960s. Middle-class
Latino students often have a parent or grandparent who was a migrant
worker or a domestic. Increasingly our Asian-American students are the
children of first-generation immigrants. The lessons of struggle in family
histories are not lost on these students. There remains in their communi-
ties an ethic of remembering one's roots, of "representing the race" and
of giving back.1 15 Family, community, and the students' own day-by-day
experiences with racism shape these students' politics. Despite their mid-
112. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
113. See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939, 967-83 (1997); see also Fran Ainsley, Classifying Race,
Racializing Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1001, 1101 (1997) (arguing that affirmative action
may be necessary to combat societal racism against black middle class).
114. I have elsewhere discussed the relationship between our universities and the
larger project of anti-racism:
When racial diversity's purpose is anti-racism, or more inclusively, anti-
subordination, its defense is clear .... Certainly a university is justified, and I
would argue morally and constitutionally obligated, to center its pedagogy and
research around disestablishing white supremacist structures and ideologies.
Once we acknowledge the continuing existence of racism and commit ourselves
to its disestablishment, the applicant who has been identified and treated by
society as a subordinated racial minority will bring to that freedom fighting
enterprise a life experience that makes her peculiarly qualified for the task.
Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 775.
115. See W.E.B. DuBois, The Talented Tenth, originally published in The Negro
Problem (1903), reprinted in Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Cornel West, The Future of the
Race 133 (1996) (urging middle class blacks to take responsibility for social and economic
uplift of poor blacks); see also Halimah D. DeLaine, A Critical Analysis of the Intersection
of Race and Responsibility for the Black Middle Class (May 1, 2000) (unpublished paper,
on file with the Columbia Law Review) (considering several black scholars' treatment of
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dle class status, they have an instinctive suspicion of privilege and an intu-
itive understanding of the many faces of subordination.' 16
The Michigan study's findings on the positive effect of diversity on
students' ability to engage in more complex modes of thought offers ad-
ditional evidence of the benefits of racial diversity even within an elitist
model. Smart students get smarter when they are challenged to engage
and understand novel or unfamiliar ideas and experiences. The task calls
for both cognitive and emotional competence. It involves empathy as
well as logic; a capacity for seeing the world through another's eyes and
analyzing the more complicated picture that emerges when one exam-
ines a problem through multiple lenses. It is an enterprise that requires
us to live and work with real people who talk back to us.
I have noted the strategic and substantive arguments for supporting
the liberal defense of affirmative action, but the knot in my gut lingers-
an uneasiness that betrays my deep distrust of what is in the end a conces-
sion to conservatism. I worry that I may be attracted to the liberal de-
fense because I share in the privilege it seeks to preserve. I am the ideal
diversity candidate because I am different, but not too different from my
white colleagues. I am among those black and brown folk who are best
suited to the task of integrating the academy when the university's pri-
mary goal is the education and legitimization of an intellectual and pro-
fessional elite.' 17
I am not at all certain that I am any closer to the resolution of my
ambivalence. The dilemma I face is quite concrete. When a university's
administration or legal counsel consults me concerning how best to
frame or defend affirmative action policies; when one of the parties to a
case asks me to serve as an expert witness in litigation or to write an ami-
cus brief; when I speak to my colleagues at lunch or in faculty meetings,
or address a student rally or demonstration; I must ask myself whether I
can in good conscience recommend and support the liberal strategy.
black identity and responsibility and examining contemporary views of black middle class
individuals in their twenties).
116. I am indebted to Roger Wilkins, the noted historian, journalist, and long time
civil rights activist, for his insightful observation regarding the continuing need for
affirmative action for middle-class blacks. When Professor Wilkins was asked why the
children of middle-class blacks like himself should benefit from affirmative action, he
answered, "Because fighting racism in white institutions is hand to hand combat. If my
daughter is among the best-trained and most committed freedom fighters, we must have
her here with us. We need every warrior we can muster."
117. The ideal minority candidate for law school teaching positions is one whose
resume is indistinguishable from her white male counterparts. See Charles R. Lawrence
III, Minority Hiring in the A.A.L.S. Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20
U.S.F. L. Rev. 429, 432-36 (1986) (describing the prerequisites to serious consideration for
employment to tenure track positions at law schools). As Catherine MacKinnon has noted
in the context of gender, the women most benefited by the liberal vision of equality are
those "women who have been able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates
the male norm." See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32, 37 (1987).
[Vol. 101:928
HeinOnline -- 101 Colum. L. Rev. 962 2001
TWO VIEWS OF THE RIVER
The diversity defense may prove most attractive to the center of a con-
servative Court, and therefore most likely to withstand legal attack, but
should not I take a critical stance that challenges the strategy's inherent
racism?
Ultimately, I believe I must do both. I must defend existing affirma-
tive action programs because they have profoundly changed the face of
America's institutions of higher learning. Without them, budding oases
of diversity would once again turn arid, and they have pushed open doors
for so many individuals who have done great good. I must, at the same
time, challenge the gatekeepers of the still-too-narrow openings to push
them open further.
Some may say, "He wants to have his radical principles and eat prag-
matic politics too," and surely I do. I do not believe, however, that such
an approach requires choosing between my principles and political prag-
matism. I think it is about engaging in transformative politics. I use the
words "transformative politics" to name the path by which we might redis-
cover and embrace the moral claim that first moved us to fight segrega-
tion and to challenge the structural and symbolic subordination of peo-
ple of color.
The more radical moral claim for substantive equality and against
subordination lives within the liberal defense of affirmative action, albeit
in co-tenancy with a strong inclination toward the preservation of privi-
lege. The claim for equality runs in the deepest currents of Bowen and
Bok's River, and we can find a common ground there. I believe this com-
mon ground is discovered in the shared knowledge that our democracy
was born in slavery, with slavery written into the very text of the Constitu-
tion, and in our understanding that the legacy of that horrible constitu-
tional contradiction lives with us still. 118 We have abolished slavery and
outlawed discrimination in public accommodations, education, housing,
and employment, but, as much as ever before, we live worlds apart, segre-
gated by race and class. 119 We send our children to schools that are in-
creasingly separate and unequal.1 20
When Bowen, Bok, and other liberals argue that affirmative action is
required for racial diversity, when they say diversity works, and when they
cite evidence of friendship between black and white students and profes-
sional colleagues as proof thereof, they make a moral argument, an argu-
ment that is not just a matter of policy or practical consequence but of
principle. Their argument supports affirmative action because it is just
and because we are ethically bound to live out the ideals of our democ-
118. See Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice
34-35 (1987) (citing William Wiecek's list of eight different provisions in the Constitution
that directly or indirectly accommodated slavery).
119. See generally Nancy Denton & Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid:
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 1-8 (1993) (arguing that racial inequality
and urban poverty are largely results of racial residential segregation).
120. See id. at 153.
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racy and participate in the ongoing struggle to make democracy live. 121
If the contradiction between the unifying American dream of inclusion
and the reality of America's racism is, as Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myr-
dal observed, our American dilemma, 122 then America's leading institu-
tions of learning and research must make the resolution of that contra-
diction central to their mission.
The liberal argument for race-sensitive admissions is, in part, a utili-
tarian one. It is premised on a widely shared belief that the primary mis-
sion of colleges and universities is to educate those students who are
likely to become the leaders of society in an increasingly diverse world. 123
In Bowen and Bok's words, "The advantages of being able to understand
how others think and function, to cope across racial divides, and to lead
groups composed of diverse individuals are certain to increase."1 24 Edu-
cation for leadership, however, is more than skills training for business
executives, doctors, and lawyers. Our best colleges and universities have
always played a central role in shaping our society's moral vision. We
socialize our students. We teach them values by engaging them in moral
discourse, but even more importantly, we teach by the example of our
own leadership in the construction of our nation's conscience.
The argument for racial diversity cannot in the end rest only upon a
university's choice to expose its students to a more colorful, more cultur-
ally diverse universe, or on a cost-benefit analysis of the need for an inte-
grated elite in a soon-to-be majority non-white nation, or, as the Bakke
Court argued, on the faculty's First Amendment right to academic free-
dom. We must integrate our universities because we cannot fulfill our
democratic ideal until we have conquered the scourge of American
apartheid. And we cannot teach and learn about racism in classrooms
where only white folks are present.125
IV. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
If the common ground I share with my liberal colleagues is a moral
commitment to ending racism, I must consider how best to use this un-
derstanding in the day-to-day work of fighting for more radical change
while defending the gains made by affirmative action against attacks from
the right. How, in other words, does one expose and tap the root of
121. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Promises to Keep: We are the Constitution's
Framers, 30 How. LJ. 645, 653 (1987); Gerald Lopez, The Idea of a Constitution in the
Chicano Tradition, 37 J. Legal Educ. 162, 163-66 (1987). Each of these argue that
constitutions are not static but dynamic reflections and products of a people's ongoing
struggles for dignity, equality, and power.
122. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy 1021 (1944).
123. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at 280.
124. Id. at 279. This argument for diversity has special impact because, as Bowen and
Bok's data show, the more selective the school a student attends, the more he or she is
likely to accomplish and contribute in later life. Id. at 281.
125. See Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 765.
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liberals' ethical commitment to a more radical vision of equality while
defending the good we have achieved through the diversity defense?
Transformative politics requires looking beyond winning or losing
the particular legal dispute or political battle and asking how one's ac-
tions serve to reinforce people's awareness of our interdependence and
mutual responsibility as members of the human family. Critical legal the-
orists have typically focused their attention on how best to expand the
political consciousness of members of subordinated communities, urging
progressive lawyers to use the legal system to increase people's "sense of
personal and political power."1 26 They have argued that the lawyer who
adopts this "power-oriented" approach to justice advocacy "should always
attempt to reshape the way legal conflicts are represented in the law, re-
vealing the limiting character of legal ideology and bringing out the true
socioeconomic and political foundations of legal disputes." 127 This ad-
monition is directed primarily to the lawyer who is representing clients
and political movements seeking to subvert the power of an oppressive
state.128
Transformative politics also seeks to change the political conscious-
ness of those privileged by systems of subordination.1 29 The task is to
help the privileged comprehend the profound costs associated with ine-
quality-the public costs of prisons, crime, illiteracy, disease, and the vio-
lence of an alienated underclass-as well as the personal costs of loneli-
126. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369, 376 (1983); see also
Arthur Kinoy, Rights on Trial: The Odyssey of a People's Lawyer 57-59 (1983) (noting
that success for an activist lawyer is not measured in "technical winning or losing" but in
"the impact of the legal activities on the morale and understanding of the people involved
in the struggle"). Paulo Freire argues that a true commitment to the people, and to the
transformation of the reality by which they are oppressed, requires a theory of
transforming action that assigns to the people a "fundamental role in the transformation
process. . . .It is absolutely essential that the oppressed participate in the revolutionary
process with an increasingly critical awareness of their role as Subjects of the
transformation." Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed 120-21 (1971).
127. Gabel & Harris, supra note 126, at 376.
128. For example, Gabel and Harris discuss how:
the defendants and their attorneys in the Chicago Eight conspiracy trial subverted
the prosecution's attempt to use the sanctity of the legal process to recast the
meaning of the anti-war protests at the 1968 Democratic convention, to
recharacterize the protestors as hooligans, and to substitute a narrow and
depoliticized legal description of the events. "By openly flaunting the
hierarchical norms of the courtroom and ridiculing the judge, the prosecutor,
and the nature of the charges themselves, they successfully rejected the very forms
of authority upon which the legitimacy of the war itself depended.
Id. at 381.
129. Freire argues that oppression "marks not only those whose humanity has been
stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it .... [T]he great
humanistic and historical task of the oppressed [is to] liberate themselves and their
oppressors as well." Freire, supra note 126, at 28.
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ness and anomie in a world where no one is responsible for the pain of
any other person. 130
The work of subverting privilege may seem at odds with that which
seeks to liberate the privileged. Sometimes it is, but I think that they are
often complementary tasks. By this, I mean that when we reshape the
presentation of legal conflicts to reveal the injury that inequality of power
and privilege does to the subordinated, we may discover a concomitant
injury to the privileged as well. Those with power, including the liberal
defenders of affirmative action, may rely on the mystifying power of law to
make their privilege seem legitimate to themselves as well as to subordi-
nated others, and it surely unsettles them when subordinated people
challenge the legitimacy of the very system that defines justice. But once
the mask comes off, and liberals must resolve the conflict between justice
and privilege, they may find that privilege in an unjust world has few
comforts.
The particulars of this transformative practice are governed by con-
text and do not lend themselves to bright line rules. The candid conver-
sation with my Dean may sound quite different from the formal policy
that is drafted at its conclusion. My comments at a faculty meeting may
appeal to community, encouraging colleagues who share my privilege to
see how much more we have to gain by doing the right thing. A brief
filed in the Rios suit, on the other hand, will likely highlight the differ-
ences in the plaintiffs' and defendants' interests, identifying the real vic-
tims in the current system and encouraging the Court to act where the
political process is unlikely to yield change. I will continue to call Boalt
Hall and UCLA and Texas "segregated law schools" so long as they lack
significant numbers of African Americans and Latinos. Civil rights orga-
nizations might hold hearings at Berkeley and UCLA and take testimony
on the causes and effects of the re-segregation of the university. Such
hearings would document systemic conditions of inequality throughout
the California educational system as well as the University's participation
in the perpetuation of those conditions. Since 1989, Professor Michael
Olivas, chair of the professors committee of the Hispanic Bar Association
of Maricopa County, has compiled the "Dirty Dozen" list. The "Dirty
Dozen" list points a "finger of shame" at those law schools located in areas
with large number of Latinos, where Latino faculty members are under-
represented.1 3 ' A clear oppositional voice must counter the story that
says these law schools are not the perpetrators and that therefore neither
130. For a utopian argument for affirmative action, see Lawrence & Matsuda, supra
note 10, at 270-80; see also Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2195, 2217
(2000) (offering a utopian vision of causation doctrine to address moral responsibility for
harms done to others).
131. Since its inception, the "Dirty Dozen" lists have included some of the nation's
leading law schools such as Yale, Harvard, and New York University. According to Professor
Olivas, the notoriety of the list stimulates demand and has resulted in the hiring of forty
Hispanic faculty in those institutions making the list in previous years. Ronald Sal Panuco,
Top Law Schools Still Rank Among Latino Dirty Dozen, Los Abogados (Hispanic Bar
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injury nor crime exists. 13 2 In each of these settings, I must determine
how to subvert the legitimacy of the part of the liberal defense that serves
oppression and support the liberating spirit at its core.
The University of Michigan cases provide an instructive example of
the need for transformative politics. Concerned that the University
would not adequately represent the interests of minority and white appli-
cants and of other students who desire the benefits of attending a racially-
diverse university, black, Latino, Filipino-American, Asian-American, and
white students, and several pro-affirmative action coalitions have inter-
vened in both the Grutter and the Gratz litigation.1 33 The intervenors
have taken a first important step in demanding that the true victims'
voices be heard and in subverting the legal fiction that only recognizes
injury to the white plaintiffs and makes the University a defender, never a
violator, of minority rights. The task for the Michigan intervenors cannot
be subversion alone. They will gain little by simply telling the Court that
both the plaintiffs and defendants are up to no good.
Instead, they must do two things at once. They must unmask the
"big lie" that provides the starting point for the University's "liberal" de-
fense, proffering evidence of the University's past and continuing dis-
criminatory practices and explaining to the court why a race-conscious
admissions policy is a necessary antidote to the conscious racism of the
past as well as the unconscious and institutional racism of the present.134
Association of Maricopa County) Jan. 1999, at http://www.losabogados.org/newsletters/
jannews.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
132. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing the difference
between the victim and perpetrator perspectives of equality).
133. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
134. The early stages of this litigation have demonstrated the efficacy of this
approach. On December 13, 2000, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in Gratz with respect to
the admissions policy of the College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA) of the
University of Michigan, holding that "the LSA's current admissions program meets the
requirements ... set forth by Justice Powell in Bakke and is therefore constitutional."
While the District Court's decision turned on its adherence to Bakke's "diversity defense,"
the court noted in its opinion that two interests had been asserted in support of the LSA's
race-conscious admissions policies: "The University Defendants assert that the LSA has a
compelling interest in the educational benefits that result from having a diverse student
body, whereas the Defendant-Intervenors assert that the LSA has a compelling interest in
remedying past and current discrimination against minorities." 122 F. Supp. 2d at 816. In
a footnote the Court explained that "only the Defendant Intervenors have asserted that the
LSA's admissions policies serve a remedial purpose. The University Defendants have never
justified the LSA's race-conscious admissions on remedial grounds." Id. at 816 n.5.
Intervenors supplemented the University's case with evidence that the University was
reluctant to offer, despite the fact that such evidence was potentially helpful to its case. For
example, the Defendant Intervenors brief in support of Defendants motion for summary
judgment includes offers of undisputed fact on the following issues: the de facto
segregation of the University prior to affirmative action; the systematic bias, discriminatory
impact and minimal predictive validity of standardized tests employed in admissions; that a
critical mass of minority students is required to dismantle persistent racial stigma and
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At the same time, they must help the University, and even the Court, to
understand how the compelling interest in diversity is inseparable from
the compelling interest in the remedy of the university's and society's
racism. The task here is to find a way to make the doctrinal argument
from Bakke-that the University must have the freedom to create a ra-
cially diverse learning environment-without allowing the University to
escape its legal and moral responsibility for curing itself and society of the
disease of racism.
The measure of success in this effort will not turn on whether Gratz
v. Bollinger is won or lost, but will depend on what is learned in the pro-
cess. During the course of this litigation, will we discover, document, and
better understand the myriad ways that the university's past and present
practices contribute to and reinforce societal racism? Will the faculties
and administrations at elite colleges and universities develop new and
creative affirmative action strategies that can withstand the scrutiny of a
conservative Court while increasing the number of students who come to
their schools from diverse race and class backgrounds? Will progressive
advocates for more radical versions of inclusion be inspired to engage in
the political battle to transform the hearts and minds of their brothers
and sisters? If the Court upholds Michigan's admissions policy by legiti-
mizing a system that recreates an educational elite, and if the University
does not realize its responsibility for leadership in the quest for equality,
there will be little reason to rejoice. If the University is truly committed
to integration and racial equality, a Supreme Court decision striking
down Michigan's current admissions program need not mean the end of
affirmative action. If we have the political will to do justice, it can be
accomplished.
V. JOINING THE RIVER
What of Proposition 209? Berkeley's chancellor has argued that the
University of California cannot engage in affirmative action because it is
"constrained by a statewide ban on preferences."13 5 Short of civil disobe-
dience, what course can the University take to live out its moral obliga-
tion? I want to suggest that the legal constraints imposed by Proposition
209, the Hopwood decision, and other provisions prohibiting the use of
race in university admissions may offer an opportunity to move closer to
stereotypes by white students and faculty, to ensure full participation by minority students
in a campus climate still marked by racism, and to achieve the full educational benefits of
integration and diversity. Defendant-Intervenor's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-17, 19-24, 31, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No 97-CV-75231-DT). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, No.
97-CV-75928-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3256 at *140-*42 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2001)
(finding that testimony presented by intervenors of past and contemporary discrimination
was evidence of societal discrimination, rather than evidence of discrimination against
those applicants who benefited from the law school's admissions policy, and holding that
race-conscious decision-making cannot constitutionally remedy societal discrimination).
135. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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the radical vision of affirmative action, a vision that adopts the victim per-
spective and creatively shapes remedies that directly address remaining
conditions of inequality. 136
Texas's "ten percent plan" provides one model. It requires the Uni-
versity of Texas to admit the top ten percent of every high school's gradu-
ating class. The criterion for admission is race neutral, but it has brought
more African-American and Mexican-American students to the Austin
campus than had the outlawed affirmative action program. By treating
the top students at each of the state's schools as "most qualified," the
University takes responsibility for existing discriminatory conditions in a
state where most schools are still racially segregated and unequally fi-
nanced, training future leaders from oppressed and under-served com-
munities, and challenging the state to make its separate and unequal
schools equal. 13 7 In California it appears that a similar plan proposed by
Governor Gray Davis will have little impact on the racial integration of
the UC system, much less the Berkeley campus, 1 38 but this may only mean
136. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Justice
Powell's diversity argument and asserting that the use of race to achieve diversity of points
of view in educational settings assumes "that race controls [one's] point of view"); see also
Darlene C. Goring, Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action in the 21st
Century, 33 Akron L. Rev. 209, 274-87 (2000) (arguing that a new weapon in the fight to
eradicate racism ought to be introduced in light of the restrictions reflected in Hopwood
and other decisions: a Congressional inquiry into the operation of present and past
discrimination at educational institutions, which could then be used to implement and
uphold race-based remedial programs); Lawrence, Harvest, supra note 13, at 770-74
(arguing that the Hopwood decision is an extension of Justice Powell's troublesome
restriction on remedial affirmative action in Bakke, which has the effect of undermining
what ought to be affirmative action's true purpose of fighting racism); Barbara Phillips
Sullivan, The Gift of Hopwood: Diversity and the Fife and Drum March Back to the
Nineteenth Century, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 291, 296 (1999) (arguing that Hopwood was right to
reject the diversity rationale because the diversity rationale puts "self-defined interests" of
educational institutions above the need for racial justice and equality).
137. The "ten-percent plan" was enacted by the Texas state legislature in March 1997.
The plan entitles the top ten percent of the graduating class of each accredited high
school in Texas to attend the University of Texas (UT) at Austin or any other UT or A&M
campus. The plan arose as a means of increasing minority enrollment in Texas's state
universities in response to the 1996 decision in Hopwood. See William E. Forbath & Gerald
Torres, Symposium, Merit and Diversity After Hopwood, 10 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 185, 185
(1999). Forbath and Torres argue that the plan presents the possibility for dismantling the
traditional elitism of top state research universities like UT Austin and bringing about "a
significant increase in diversity across racial, ethnic, and economic lines." Id. at 186-87. In
addition, the plan has heightened attention to the radical inequities in public education by
raising the question, "How is it that some public schools in Texas cannot prepare their
students either for university level work or the economy?" Id. at 189.
138. On March 19, 1999, the University of California Board of Regents adopted the
policy to guarantee admission to all California applicants who ranked in the top four
percent of their high school class. The plan, to take effect in the fall of 2001, was
championed by Governor Davis as a mean of boosting minority numbers in the UC system.
Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Regents OK Plan to Admit Top 4%, L.A. Times, Mar. 20, 1999, at
A18. However, it appears that the plan will do little to boost minority numbers, with only
an estimated 877 more blacks and Hispanics qualifying for the University of California
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that states such as California and Michigan need to identify their own
peculiar discriminatory conditions and find the admissions policies that
address them.
The Rios litigation suggests several possibilities that would identify
talented students that are representative of diverse communities. For in-
stance, a school could give less weight to discriminatory SATs and LSATs,
or establish a floor above which students would be considered on other
criteria.'3 9 If fifty percent of Berkeley students come from five percent of
California schools, why not give extra points to students from schools
whose graduates seldom get into Berkeley, 140 or target zip codes or cen-
sus tracts with conditions that indicate that young people from those ar-
eas have overcome significant obstacles of race and class discrimina-
tion?14  California prisons hold disproportionate numbers of African
under the new plan. Ben Wildavsky, Whatever Happened to Minority Students?
Universities Try Risky New Steps to Diversify, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 22, 1999, at 28,
29. A University of California faculty group concluded in a study that "only 5 percent of
the newly eligible students seeking entry under the . . . new plan would be African-
American and 20 percent would be Latino." V. Dion Haynes, U. of California Alters Its
Policy on Admissions; Change Aims to Increase Number of Minority Students, Chi. Trib.,
Mar. 20, 1999, at 1. Whites and Asian Americans would comprise 56% and 11%
respectively. Id.
139. In the wake of Hopwood and Proposition 209, the University of Texas and the
University of California devised new admissions plans that aimed to reduce the significance
of the numerical grid consisting of GPAs and SAT scores in making admissions decisions.
James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 44,
50-51, 76. The University of Texas asked applicants to describe their achievements in light
of disadvantages they may have experienced. Id. at 78. Similarly, the University of
California considered SAT scores in the context of the applicant's "history and
circumstances," including attendance at a substandard school. Id. Claude Steele and
Joshua Aronson suggest that efforts to reduce the influence of SAT scores are logical in
light of studies showing that minority test performance is affected by fear of racial
stereotyping because these students are aware that their test results will be used to judge
intellectual ability. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 797,
808 (1995).
140. Some private philanthropists have identified communities in which children may
be less inclined or less financially able to attend college and have created programs to
enable them to attain levels of higher education, including promising elementary and
junior high school children scholarships if they succeed through high school. For
example, the nationwide "I Have a Dream" program links fifth-grade children with local
mentors, who work with the children until high school graduation, and guarantees these
children college scholarships. See Sheba R. Wheeler, At-Risk Students Given Tools to
Dream, Denv. Post, June 11, 1998, at B-02. Similar programs have arisen throughout the
country. See, e.g., Robert Dorr, Scotts Giving Scholarships to Youths Facing Challenges,
Omaha World-Herald, Oct. 21, 1999, at I (describing private program funding
scholarships for Omaha-area colleges for graduates of a local elementary school "who have
kept up their grades and graduated from high school"); Melanie Markley, A Dream
Realized, Hous. Chron., Mar. 20, 2000, at A24 (describing Merrill Lynch college
scholarship fund set up for first-graders at Houston elementary school).
141. Richard Fallon has described one proposal by the UCLA School of Law
Admissions Task Force which, in 1996, recommended basing decisions partly on a "socio-
economic index." This would include, among a number of other factors, whether
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Americans and Latinos. Universities could advantage students from
neighborhoods with high rates of incarceration. Why not give extra
points to the student who has had the experience of being racially iso-
lated in his or her school? This would include black kids who have nego-
tiated and survived in privileged white schools and white kids who have
stuck it out in predominantly black or Latino schools. 142 Race-neutral
criteria can identify young people who would bring to Berkeley the spe-
cial skills and experience that relate directly to the University's mission of
fighting racism.
In the aftermath of Proposition 209, Berkeley adopted new admis-
sions criteria not unlike some of those I have suggested. The University
evaluates applicants on a range of academic and non-academic achieve-
ments, and those achievements are considered "in the context of the op-
portunities an applicant has had, any hardships or unusual circumstances
the applicant has faced and the ways in which he or she has responded to
them."'1 43 Admissions files include a detailed profile of the applicant's
high school so that the reader can recognize the student who has suc-
ceeded despite attending a substandard school and consider the appli-
cant's SAT score in light of his or her unique history or circumstance. 144
[t]he poverty rate in the zip code in which the student attended high school is
greater than 18%; . . .[m]ore than 5% of the adults in the zip code where the
student resided during high school receive welfare; .. .[or] [m]ore than 20% of
the households where the student resided during high school are female-headed.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L.
Rev. 1913, 1927 n.47 (1996) (quoting UCLA Admissions Task Force, Final Report on Law
School Admissions, Apr. 11, 1996).
142. This criterion would have several salutary effects in addition to its race neutrality.
It would include middle-class black and Latino students who would not be identified by
criteria based on socio-economic disadvantage. Most impoverished black and Latino
students have suffered extreme deprivation of educational opportunity and are not even in
the running for slots in elite universities. Thus, criteria based on socio-economic
disadvantage are not effective in increasing rates of minority enrolment of those schools.
Criteria based on racial isolation, however, might be. Black and Latino students who
attend predominantly white schools will have the experience of surviving in a
predominantly white environment, of representing the race, and of cross-cultural teaching
and learning. The criterion will also include the racially isolated white student in a
predominantly black or Latino school. Like the black student in a predominantly white
school, this student will have expertise in cross-cultural discourse and in teaching and
learning about racism. The criterion might also provide an incentive for parents to choose
schools where their children are not in the majority and thus further the goal of school
integration.
143. Traub, supra note 139, at 78.
144. Richard C. Atkinson, president of the University of California, has proposed that
the University of California end the use of SATs as a requirement for admission. Atkinson
criticized the use of SAT scores to rank students for admission, saying they are "not
compatible with the American view on how merit should be defined and opportunities
distributed." Diana Jean Schemo, Head of U. of California Seeks to End SAT Use in
Admissions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al. The president's proposal "came several years
after a university faculty committee urged that the SAT be made optional to increase the
number of black and [Latino] students gaining admission." Id.
2001]
HeinOnline -- 101 Colum. L. Rev. 971 2001
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Not surprisingly, opponents of affirmative action have attacked these
efforts to look beyond test scores and give more attention to each individ-
ual's unique qualifications as transparent attempts to reinstitute "unlaw-
ful" racial criteria.1 45 The view of many of affirmative action's liberal sup-
porters that the primary benefit of these new, more individualized criteria
is their opacity is also troubling. Thus, defenders of affirmative action,
not unlike detractors, see the new criteria as a pretense for racial prefer-
ence, albeit a pretense that isjustified 1 46 Their defense does not rest on
a belief that the criteria reflect skills, perspectives and knowledge valuable
in a university setting. That liberals as well as conservatives have viewed
these new standards for admission as little more than old style "racial
preference" in disguise reveals how difficult it is for liberals to eschew
conventional definitions of merit. This very failure to abandon old ways,
in substance and spirit, as well as form, has made the liberal defense sus-
ceptible to attack.
A better and more defensible approach would re-imagine merit in
light of the university's commitment to the goal of fighting racism. When
that goal is articulated, admissions criteria aimed at identifying those best
qualified to achieve it are transparent in the best sense of that word.
They clearly reveal and make apparent a legitimate means of achieving
an important purpose.
But won't many students who come from poor schools be poorly pre-
pared for the rigorous academic requirements at our top schools? Cer-
tainly, some of them will be, but this problem has solutions. We know
how to run programs that teach intelligent, motivated students the skills
needed to survive and even excel at elite universities. 1 47 Such programs
145. Stephan Thernstrom claims that admissions departments have "figured out how
to circumvent the law." Traub, supra note 139, at 78.
146. James Traub, in an article that describes the new Berkeley admissions process in
quite sympathetic terms, asks, "How should we feel about the murky, opaque fiddling that
is bound to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of preferences?" Id. at 78. His
tentative answer: "[P]erhaps we should accept a dent in meritocratic purity as a fair price
for admitting students as individuals, not group members." Id. Traub quotesJack Critin, a
conservative professor of political science who quit the admissions committee when the
new criteria were promulgated. "'I don't think we're in the therapy business,' Critin says.
'I think what we have happening here is an attack on the idea of merit as conventionally
defined."' Id.
147. We have been successful in developing undergraduate academic support
programs in universities nationwide. For a survey of some of these successes, see John E.
Roueche et al., College Responses to Low-Achieving Students: A National Study 86-89
(1984). Law schools have developed a range of academic support programs as well,
including the Council for Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO) pre-start summer
institutes, as well as classes, study groups, and workshops offered during the school year.
Kathy L. Cerminara, Remembering Arthur: Some Suggestions for Law School Academic
Support Programs, 21 T. Marshall L. Rev. 249, 255 (1996). Started in 1968, CLEO provides
pre-law school summer programs and served both to recruit students who might not
otherwise be qualified based on LSAT scores and GPA and to develop the academic skills
of students who had already been admitted to law school. Id. at 262-63.
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require only the commitment and resources to teach them, and a belief
that students who do not come from privilege can learn.
Furthermore, the university can actively participate in righting an
unequal elementary and secondary education system. Why not establish
partnerships between the university and schools in poor minority neigh-
borhoods? 148 Why not send university students out to teach reading,
math, calculus, chemistry, and literature to students in those schools?
Why not do as some philanthropists have done, and tell these students
while they are still in elementary school, "If you are an A student in this
school you will go to Berkeley on a full scholarship"?149
When confronted with the stark inequalities of our nation's elemen-
tary and secondary education systems, opponents of affirmative action
often assert their sense of outrage at the system's inadequacies, but
quickly argue that institutions of higher learning are neither responsible
for nor capable of correcting those inequalities.1 50 This argument ex-
empts elite universities, more than others, from any obligation to right
the fundamental injustices of our educational system. It holds that great
universities like those at Berkeley, Austin, or Ann Arbor should focus on
path-breaking research and scholarship and the education of the best
and the brightest. If an uneven playing field exists, lesser universities
148. The University of California spent $137 million in 1999 on partnerships with
public schools and other outreach efforts to recruit more minority students from local
high schools. See Wildavsky, supra note 138, at 28-29; see also Renee C. Lee, New
Diversity Paths Get Urgent Attention, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 24, 1999, at 1
(deeming partnership between University of Houston and local high school responsible
for lower high school drop-out and higher college matriculation numbers). The
University of Texas at Austin has undertaken similar efforts to recruit students from
schools underrepresented at the university through its Longhorn Opportunity
Scholarships. Each year, the program offers full scholarships to attend University of Texas
at Austin to a certain number of students at selected high schools. The program also
includes academic support for scholarship recipients. See Office of Student Fin. Servs.,
Univ. Tex. at Austin, Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship, at http://www.utexas.edu/
student/finaid/quickinfo/los.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
149. See Lee, supra note 148, at 1 (noting that the University of Texas at Arlington
targets local eighth graders and promises admission to the university if they fulfill certain
academic requirements). Similarly, legislation following the Hopwood decision requires the
University of Texas to accept "anyone who graduates in the top 10 percent of any state
high school." See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 32, at 396 (suggesting that
compensatory education is a difficult task for institutions of higher learning as professors
are not skilled in providing remedial education); see also Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal
Education 232-33, 252-53 (1991) (arguing that the "special stigma" of racial preferences
and relative unpreparedness of minority students should convince universities to admit
applicants based only on their "measured capabilities"); Stephen Kershnar, Strong
Affirmative Action Programs at State Educational Institutions Cannot Be Justified via
Compensatory Justice, 11 Pub. Aff. Q. 345, 360 (1997) ("Merely having benefitted from
unjust injuring act[s] or being a member of a community that owes a debt of
compensation to racial minorities and women, are not sufficient grounds to override the
duty owed to the white male.").
HeinOnline -- 101 Colum. L. Rev. 973 2001
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
should make it level. Until then, the best universities should educate
those who are best prepared. 1 51 "The University of California in its eight
institutions can not reform the public schools," says Berkeley's Chancel-
lor Robert Berdahl, when asked about the University's role in expanding
the pool of eligible minority students. 15 2 Yet to describe the goal of aca-
demic excellence as incompatible with that of societal reform creates a
false dichotomy. Nor does it accurately describe what great universities
have done in practice.
Great universities have always combined teaching and research with
leadership in solving society's most pressing problems. Whether in the
discovery of a vaccine, the creation of new technology, the formulation of
foreign trade agreements, or the development of models for domestic
economic and social policy, the academy has often done its most signifi-
cant intellectual work through direct hands-on involvement with the de-
velopment and implementation of public policy. "The best" are exactly
who should address our most pressing societal needs.
When people say, "But we cannot lower standards," I hear a fear that
taking on talented disadvantaged students will diminish the stature and
status of a great school. This is a lie, ripe with racist presupposition. Af-
firmative action has made Berkeley, Texas, and Michigan better places,
and, if the attack on affirmative action forces us to create strategies of
empowerment that reflect deeper and more radical versions of affirma-
tive action, the best of our schools will become greater still.
The river in the title of Bowen and Bok's book, The Shape of the River,
is a metaphor borrowed from Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi. "Twain
created an image of the river as both physically central to the United
States and symbolically central to the progress of the country."'1 53 Bowen
and Bok say that their river represents "the flow of talent-particularly of
talented black men and women-through the country's system of higher
education and on into the marketplace and the larger society."'1 5 4 They
compare nurturing this flow of black talent "to moving down a winding
river, with rock-strewn rapids and slow channels, muddy at times and
clear at others. Particularly when race is involved, there is nothing sim-
ple, smooth, or highly predictable about the education of young
people." 155
The former presidents of Harvard and Princeton cast themselves as
the river boat pilots in this metaphor, navigating the river from "point to
point." They say the pilots must know "every depth, every deceptive
151. The University of California at Riverside, a UC campus that is significantly less
prestigious and selective than Berkeley or UCLA, has implemented an outreach program
into area high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools to attempt to foster
academic achievement. Traub, supra note 139, at 46, 49.
152. Id. at 49.
153. Bowen & Bok, supra note 25, at xxi.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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shoal, and every hidden snag of the river.... [They must] know the
river's features in every imaginable condition, and from either
direction."1 56
I am struck by who is the river in this metaphor-"dark," "muddy,"
"deceptive," "unpredictable"-and who are the pilots, who must know
this river so that it can be navigated, if not controlled. I am also re-
minded of another river metaphor. It is the metaphor of historian Vin-
cent Harding's book, There Is a River: The Struggle for Black Freedom in
America. 157 Here too, we African Americans are the river. But Harding's
river is the river of liberation-the many currents of black survival, pro-
test, radical resistance, and rebellion. It is the river of the Negro spiritu-
als and the rivers of Langston Hughes's magnificent poem.158 For Har-
ding, this historical river of struggle for Black freedom is "at its heart a
profoundly human quest for transformation, a constantly evolving move-
ment.., toward new social structures filled with justice, equity, and com-
passion .... [A] t its deepest levels the river moves toward a freedom that
liberates the whole person and humanizes the entire society."' 9
This is a very different view of the river than the one from the
riverboat pilot's seat. Ultimately this river cannot be tamed, controlled,
or even navigated. Better to join it. Better to become part of its power-
ful, joyful current of transformation.
156. Id.
157. Vincent Harding, There Is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America
(1981).
158. Langston Hughes, The Negro Speaks of Rivers, in The Poetry of Black America
72, 72 (Arnold Adoff ed., 1973).
159. Harding, supra note 157, at xxiv.
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